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CHICAGO v. MORALES: CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES AT LOGGERHEADS WITH
COMMUNITY ACTION
INTRODUCTION
The year 1990 was ominous for Chicago.' Although the city's popu-
lation had dropped by more than 200,000 people in a year, there were
increases in homicides, robbery, aggravated assault, and motor vehicle
theft.2 Chicago had the fourth highest per capita rate of violent crime
in the nation.3 Drive-by shootings, drug dealing, and other gang-re-
lated activities were so prevalent in Chicago that residents had been
effectively robbed of their streets and public areas.4 Gang presence
made it impossible for any sense of community to flourish. 5
For the greater part of this century, police have combated the gang
epidemic by responding to reported infractions of the criminal law.6
However, with increasing frequency localities are turning to commu-
nity-based policing,7 where the response is based on a combined po-
lice/community effort to shore up the structure of a neighborhood.8
1. See William Recktenwald, Man shot dead at gas station; City's skyrocketing homicide total
closing in on 800, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1990, §2 at 6 ("The homicide rate in Chicago, already at its
highest level in nearly a decade, continued to climb with four slayings reported Wednesday
evening.").
2. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 18 (1990).
3. See id.
4. Ms. D'Ivory Gordon, a resident of Chicago's 7th Ward, testified during Police and Fire
Committee hearings prior to the City Council's enactment of the Gang Congregation Ordinance:
When I leave work these same guys are out there every evening. When you walk down
the street, the first thing they do is run up to you .... They watch you. They know
where you live .... I am afraid of them .... I don't want to hurt anyone, and I don't
want to be hurt. We need to clean these corners up. Clean these communities up and
take it back from them.
I TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON POLICE AND FIRE 66-
67 (Statement of D'lvory Gordon, May 11, 1992).
5. See U.S. Dept. of Justice Attorney General's Report to the President, Coordinated Ap-
proach to the Challenge of Gang Violence: A Progress Report 1 (Apr. 1996) ("From the small
business owner who is literally crippled because he refuses to pay 'protection' money to the
neighborhood gang, to the families who are hostages in their own homes, living in neighbor-
hoods ruled by predatory drug trafficking gangs, the harmful impact of gang violence ... is...
debilitating.").
6. See SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 12-14 (2d ed. 1992).
7. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
8. See George L. Kelling, Aquiring a Taste for Order: Tie Community and Police, 33 CRIME &
DELINQ. 90, 97 (1986).
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The potential power of a structured neighborhood is beautifully illus-
trated in Alexis de Tocqueville's conception of the New England
township:
The native of New England is attached to his township because it is
independent and free: his co-operation in its affairs ensures his at-
tachment to its interests; the well-being it affords him secures his
affection; and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future
expectations. He takes a part in every occurrence in the place; he
practices the art of government in the small sphere within his reach;
he accustoms himself to those forms without which liberty can only
advance by revolutions; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste
for order, comprehends the balance of powers, and collects clear
practical notions on the nature of his duties and the extent of his
rights.9
No doubt, Tocqueville's vision of community is powerful. If Chicago
residents were allowed to re-institute a structure-clearing their street
corners of menacing gangs-perhaps they too could acquire a taste for
order, and garner the fruits of democracy in America.' 0 Such a solu-
tion to the City of Chicago's problem, peppered with visions of com-
munity and easy logic, sounds too good to be true. Indeed, it is. The
United States Supreme Court recently declared the community-
backed Chicago Gang Congregation Ordinance (Ordinance)" uncon-
stitutional in City of Chicago v. Morales.'2
What could possibly be wrong with the community and police work-
ing together to rid a neighborhood of the most conspicuous roadblock
to normalcy? The answer emanates from the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The vagueness doctrine re-
quires that strictures be sufficiently specific in order to give the public
notice of what activities are illegal and to constrain police officers' use
of discretion in arbitrary or capricious ways. 13 The Court held that the
Ordinance's loose language left too much to the judgment of the Chi-
cago Police. 14
While this Note recognizes that the terms of the Ordinance were
too broad to effectively limit the police officer's discretion,' 5 it takes
issue with the Court's failure to deal with Chicago's sub-constitutional
9. Id. (quoting ALEXIS I)E TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 71 (Vintage 1945)) (em-
phasis added).
10. See id.
11. CHICAOO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1990).
12. 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
13. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352. 357 (1983).
14. Morales, 527 U.S. at 65-66.
15. See infra notes 227-235 and accompanying text.
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attempts to constrain police discretion.' 6 The Chicago Police promul-
gated General Order 92-4 (Order) to accompany the enforcement of
the Ordinance in order to tailor the Ordinance's language to the
Council's stated purpose. 17 Surprisingly, the Court gave the Order
short shrift, and recanted a mantra-like vagueness analysis that ig-
nored the need to frame new and effective forms of crime prevention
in a constitutional light. 18 Unfortunately, the Morales Court missed
an opportunity to give direct guidance to the number of jurisdictions
experimenting with new types of policing.
Part I of this Note provides a background to the interests at issue in
Morales.19 Part I outlines the development of both the community-
policing movement and the vagueness doctrine. 20 Through that lens,
it becomes more clear why community-policing measures, like the Or-
dinance, necessarily conflicts with the vagueness doctrine.21 Part II
relates the lively array of opinions in Morales.22 Part III analyzes the
Morales rationale, arguing that the Court missed the perfect opportu-
nity to provide guidance, thus contending that the Court should have
given explicit recognition to the usefulness of administrative regula-
tions like General Order 92-4 that can effectively constrain the discre-
tion of the police.23 This Part concludes that the Court was too
passively reliant on the vagueness doctrine, and thus, failed to recog-
nize the real plight of gang-plagued neighborhoods. 24 Finally, Part IV
assesses the new Ordinance that was passed by the Chicago City
Council on January 12, 2000.25 In addition, Part IV maintains that the
new Ordinance represents a conscientious response to the Morales
Court. 26 This Part concludes that the tighter language and continued
use of a police regulation strikes the necessary balance between a
community that pines for order, and the Constitution that demands a
notified public and constrained police force. 27
16. See infra Part I11.
17. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part Il1.
19. See infra Part 1.
20. See infra Part 1.
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part 11.
23. See infra Part I1.
24. See infra Part Ill.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.
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11. BACKGROUND
In examining the core concepts at issue throughout the controversy,
the community policing movement and the vagueness doctrine, it can
be concluded that the enactment of the Ordinance, and the conten-
tious litigation that followed, dismissed a perfect opportunity to sup-
port a new community policing system which would make the streets
of the community safe.
A. Community Policing
With increasing frequency, jurisdictions are adopting police mea-
sures that fall under the rubric of community policing.2 8 Since the
concept of community policing is broad, it will be helpful to examine
the emergence of community policing before turning to its application
in this Note.
The introduction of the community-policing phenomenon has been
portrayed as a reaction to the earlier system that failed.2 9 Community
policing has been part of a cyclical process. Although aspects of com-
munity policing were existent in early America, the concept waned
throughout the greater part of the Twentieth Century, and reemerged
during the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s. 30
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, law enforcement was largely
based in the community, and many of the services performed by the
28. Community-based policing has surfaced in a variety of forms. Like Chicago, a number of
localities have instituted anti-loitering laws. See James H. Burnett Ill, Ruling unlikely to affect
Milwaukee ordinances City's laws are more site-and activity-specific, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, June 11, 1999, at 3; Matthew Franck, Loitering Bill Push Continues, ALBUQUERQUE J., June
11, 1999, at Cl; Kevin Kaley, Anti-loitering bill on docket, THE CAP., June 11, 1999, at Cl; Ron
Menchaca, Anti-loitering law tough to enforce, POST & COIJRER (Charleston, S.C.), June 24,
1999, at 1; Jefferson Morley, Loitering Ordinance Debated; Issue Polarizing Annapolis, WASH.
Posi, June 24, 1999, at MDI; Editorial, City Loitering Law Is Likely To Stand, NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), June 13, 1999, at BI0.
Approximately three-quarters of the nation's 200 largest cities have enacted curfew laws. See
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEo. L.J.
1153, 1160 (1998); William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynonds, Curfews and Delinquency in Ma-
jor American Cities, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 347 (1995).
Other communities have successfully enacted anti-gang civil injunctions. See People ex rel.
Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 618 (Cal. 1997). See generally Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars:
Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV.
477 (1994) (examining California's anti-gang civil injunctions).
29. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 551, 565 (1997); see also HERMAN
GOLDSTEIN, PROILEM-ORIENTED POLICINc 22 (1990) ("It took the racial disturbances of the
1960s to call [traditional police practice] into question.").
30. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 565-73.
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police pertained directly to the maintenance of the community. 31
Since police officers were intimately connected with community life,
their work was embroiled in local politics and the graft that attached
to city politics at the turn of the century.32 In the early Twentieth
Century, a reform movement was under way to break the ward
bosses' hold over police.33 Reformers proposed the establishment of a
centralized, quasi-military, police administration that would derive its
power exclusively from the criminal laws promulgated by the legisla-
ture.34 The reform era police force was premised on an aversion to
corruption, and it sought to avoid corruption by distancing itself from
the communities. 35 As a consequence of the "retreat," the police be-
came less concerned with the general order of the neighborhoods and
more concerned with the enforcement of specific infractions of the
criminal law.36
31. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 566-67. In the nineteenth century, the police performed a
large number of social service and constabulary functions. They ran soup kitchens and disci-
plined young people for harmful but non-criminal behavior; they maintained order in public
places, preventing public alcohol use, for instance; they also provided temporary lodging for
recent immigrants. Id.
32. See, e.g., JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THF UNITED STATES 55-56 (1974).
The neighborhood policeman had a strong influence over the type of character the neighbor-
hood would adopt. See id. at 55. For instance, the criminal elements of the late nineteenth
century relied upon a sympathetic police officer in their precinct-"[t]hey couldn't operate with
an 'untouchable,' a 'crusader,' or a '100 percent copper'" in their midst. Id. at 56. The criminal
elements were fond of police officers like Alexander "Clubber" Williams, who was transferred to
New York's red-light district in the early 1880s. Id. "On learning of his transfer, he told a re-
porter that he had been living on salt chuck long enough, now he was going to get some of that
tenderloin." Id. "The Tenderloin" has been adopted as the name for major vice areas of other
cities. Id.
33. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 565-66.
34. See id. at 566; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 62. "The reformers conceived of the
city as a corporation responsible for the provision of certain services and believed that municipal
governments should be rated as to how effectively they provided them .. . . [T]hey did not
approve of cities embarking on a wider range of social services for the less well-to-do." Id.
35. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 566 (noting that some departments prohibited police
officers from talking to citizens except in the line of duty); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 22
(noting similarly that some departments prohibited police officers from talking to citizens except
in the line of duty). Prior to the reforms, most departments required that officers be residents of
the city for more than a year before they could serve on the force. See RICHARDSON, supra note
33, at 48. But when reform came, many cities followed the example of Theodore Roosevelt,
head of the reform board in New York City. Id. Roosevelt appointed a considerable number of
"upstaters" to the department. Id. Grumpy Tammanyites called the new arrivals "bushwack-
ers," claiming that the new appointees could not find their way to a single station house. Id.
36. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 567. Interestingly, the sweeping changes of the late nine-
teenth century were not wholeheartedly supported by the populace:
While the structural reformers may have talked about democracy, they were often
more interested in efficiency, honesty, businesslike government, and fearless and im-
partial law enforcement, which were the last things many of the people wanted. Effi-
ciency and businesslike government might mean cutting the public payroll, increasing
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Technological advancement in law enforcement also served to
widen the gap between communities and the police.37 Police depart-
ments around the country incorporated the automobile shortly after
its appearance on the American scene. 38 Foot patrols in many depart-
ments were totally abandoned. 39 In addition, the telephone and two-
way radio further distanced the police from regular contact with the
community. 4° Calls were placed to report specific infractions of the
criminal law, and the police, in turn, responded to specific infrac-
tions.4' Under a call-and-respond system, the police were not con-
cerned with the general order of the community; rather, they were
concerned with responding quickly to specific instances of crime.42
While the American police force became faster and more efficient,
the crime rate escalated, rising dramatically in the 1960s, and continu-
ing to rise into the mid-1970s. 43 The mass disorder of this period
forced the police to re-examine their tactics that had become removed
from the community. 44 Indeed, the urban riots of the 1960s were the
most fundamental challenge to modern police tactics. Almost every
riot was sparked by incidents with police.45 As riots became more
frequent in the late 1960s, the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders was established to assess the cause of large-scale unrest in
the work load, and decreasing the job security of municipal employees. Thorough law
enforcement could mean no beer on Sunday, and impartiality would destroy the value
of contacts and connections.
Ri HARDSON, supra note 32, at 65 (emphasis added).
37. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 567.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 117 ("In contrast to the situation where anyone need-
ing a policeman had to find one on the streets or go to the stationhouse [sic], the spread of the
telephone allowed citizens to mobilize police services quickly.").
41. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 567.
42. See RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 117 (recognizing the increased efficiency of police
departments around the country).
43. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 568.
44. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 572 ("Professionally orientated police departments...
confronted their inability to deal with urban unrest and their profound estrangement from many
of the communities they policed.").
45. See RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 191.
The 1960s saw a marked increase in mass confrontations from the sit-ins and freedom
rides of the early years of the decade in the South to the mass eruptions of the black
areas of New York, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Washington, Newark, Detroit, and a host
of smaller cities from 1964 on. Housed in overcrowded, rat-infested slums, with limited
job opportunities and having to buy inferior merchandise at inflated prices and ruinous
credit rates, the people of these areas obviously had a much wider range of grievances
than simply police performance. It is significant, however, that in all of the major riots
before the assassination of Martin Luther King, the precipitating incident involved a
hostile contact between a policeman and a civilian.
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the urban communities. 46 The Commission, popularly referred to as
the Kerner Commission, found that an aggravating factor in the recent
unrest was the police force's use of roving patrol cars that moved into
communities and conducted intensive street stops on residents.47
These incidents were cited as a main source of community resentment
for a police force that was out of touch with the community.48 Thus,
external and internal examination of police procedure, coupled with
the unmistakable rise in crime, led to police departments experi-
menting with tactics that were more focused on the community. 49
The turn to a more community-oriented policing can also be attrib-
uted to a scholarly campaign.5 0 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kel-
ling's seminal article, Broken Windows, posited the theory that
quality-of-life concerns could have a direct bearing on crime rates.5 1
Broken Windows directed an increased attention to quality-of-life
concerns, which helped start the community-policing movement of the
1980s. 52 Wilson and Kelling's argument recognized that residents of
neighborhoods with a regular police foot patrol felt more secure than
residents of other neighborhoods. 53 They observed that the former
"tended to believe that crime had been reduced, and seemed to take
fewer steps to protect themselves from crime."' 54 From this recogni-
46. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1-16 (1968)
[hereinafter KERNER REPORT]. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 571.
47. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 46, at 159-60.
48. See id.; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 191 (recognizing the Kerner Commission's
finding that policemen did not understand the residents of the urban areas that they served, and
consequently, the policemen were likely to unwittingly engage in actions that were highly
inflammatory).
49. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 22-23.
It took the racial disturbances of the 1960s to call [the gulf between citizens and police]
into question. The outpouring of hostility toward the police, evidenced in the riots and
documented in the studies that were subsequently conducted, awakened the police and
the citizenry generally to just how removed the police had become from minority com-
munities. The police were commonly characterized as "an occupation army" whose
practices offended the residents living in these areas.
Id.
50. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 578.
51. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood
safety, 249 ATL. MONTHLY 29-38 (March 1982).
52. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 578 (attributing the community policing movement of the
1980s to the impact of Broken Windows); see also Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Win-
dows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2252
(1998) (calling Broken Windows "enormously influential," and noting that it helped increase
demands for new approaches to crime fighting); Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Mis-
conduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J.
1165, 1171 (1996) (explaining how pervasive Broken Windows had become).
53. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 51, at 29.
54. Id.
2000]
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tion, Wilson and Kelling argued that the reform era police tactics had
invested too much time and energy in solving serious crimes and not
enough in tending to the day-to-day order of the neighborhoods.55
The authors contended that day-to-day order in a neighborhood was
vital because disorderly conditions can instill a pervasive fear in the
neighborhood that causes residents to draw back, ceding the streets to
those who will only accentuate the disorder.56 Thus, maintaining the
order of the neighborhood is essential to crime prevention because it
informs criminals that the neighborhood cares. 57
The failed system of the past, and the quality-of-life concerns of
today, made community policing an implemented system in jurisdic-
tions around the country.58 Generally, the new community policing
programs feature a greater effort to confront problems in terms of the
specific places, times, and situations in which they occur, and a greater
reliance on the residents immediately affected by the problems. 59
Thus, community policing efforts attempt to reconfigure the police of-
55. Id. at 32-33.
56. Id. at 31, 33. Accord James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe,
263 ATL. MONTHLY at 48 (Feb. 1989) ("[Law-abiding citizens who are afraid to go out onto the
streets filled with grafitti, winos, and loitering youths yield control of these streets .... A vicious
cycle begins of fear-induced behavior increasing the sources of that fear."); Kelling, supra note 8,
at 93 (explaining that the "dramatic consequence [ ] of fear" is the abandonment of neighbor-
hoods); Kahan & Meares, supra note 28, at 1164 ("In a community pervaded by disorder, law-
abiding individuals are likely to avoid the streets, where their simple presence would otherwise
be a deterrent to crime .... The law-abiders' fear of crime thus facilitates even more of it.").
57. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 5t, at 31. To illustrate their argument, Wilson and Kel-
ling drew the following analogy:
Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is
broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as
true in nice neighborhoods as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessa-
rily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-
breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired win-
dow is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.
Id. (second emphasis added).
An empirical study performed by political scientist Wesley Skogan indicates that Wilson and
Kelling hit on what is more than a smart analogy. See WESLEY G. SKOOAN, DISORDER AND
DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990). Skogan
gathered evidence from 40 neighborhoods in six different American cities that indicated that
residents cite disorder-in the form of loitering, drug use, vandalism, and public drinking-as
incentive for withdrawal. Id. at 10-12, 65-66, 72. Skogan concluded: "The evidence suggests that
poverty, instability, and the racial composition of neighborhoods are strongly linked to area
crime, but a substantial portion of that linkage is through disorder: their link to area crime virtu-
ally disappears when disorder is brought into the picture." Id. at 75. But see Jack R. Greene &
Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in
COMMUNrrY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALrrY 201-03 (1991) (doubting the notion that disorder
and crime exist independent of social class).
58. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
59. See JEROME E. MCELROY, COLLEEN A. COSGRAVE, & SUSAN SADD, COMMUNITY POLIC-
ING: THE CPOP IN NEW YORK 2 (1993).
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ficer's relationship to the community. 60 Rather than exercising the de-
tached role of enforcer, the community-oriented police mesh
themselves into the community, working with it to solve and avoid
problems.61
Community policing efforts already underway have been lauded by
commentators 62 and courts63 alike. However, not everyone is sold on
community policing. 64 Chief among the movement's problems is find-
ing a legal basis for the police officer's "new relationship" with the
community. 65 To many, this "new relationship" is of special concern
because police indiscretions of the past and present do not square with
the new role of the police that requires greater trust. 66 Thus, those
hasty to start community policing efforts on a grand scale are re-
minded of constitutional concerns, such as the vagueness doctrine. 67
60. See generally Livingston, supra note 29 (arguing that community policing efforts require a
changed police role); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29 (arguing that the police need to cultivate an
entirely different type of relationship with the citizens they serve).
61. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 574-78; MCELROY, supra note 59, at 2. The interactive
relationship between the community and police is aptly illustrated by the following caption in a
Chicago neighborhood's newsletter:
Future CAPS [Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy] Beat Meetings will have special
importance. We, the community, are being asked to identify gang hot spots to imple-
ment the new (Supreme Court approved) Gang Loitering Ordinance. The Superinten-
dent of Police will be required to keep an up-to-date written list of such locations. Beat
meetings are specifically written into the law as a bona fide source of information.
CAPS a Conduit for Tracking Gang Hot Spots, FEBRUARY 2000 NEWSLETI'ER (Greater
Rockwell Organization, Chicago, IL.) February 2000, at 4 (copy with author).
62. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Com-
ment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (1994) (contending that many of the communities targeted
by the community strictures will in fact benefit from them); Kahan & Meares, supra note 28, at
1164-65 ("[T]he new community policing does more than transform perceptions: it also rein-
forces the community structures that discourage crime .... It promises-and has delivered-
effective relief from crime. And yet it does so at a much smaller cost ... than do severe prison
sentences.").
63. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (praising the use of anti-gang
civil injunctions in the "urban war zone"). The California Supreme Court concluded:
To hold that the liberty of the peaceful, industrious residents of Rocksprings must be
forfeited to preserve the illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious
to the community as a whole is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution
and the whole of its sense... [p]reserving the peace is the first duty of government, and
it is for the protection of the community from the predations of the idle, the conten-
tious, and the brutal that government was invented.
Id. at 618.
64. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 52, at 2254-55 ("At best, Wilson and Kelling's thesis suggests
that we might someday want to expand police officers' already significant discretionary powers
.... The authors have done nothing ... to indicate that such a retreat from 'rule-of-law' ap-
proach is justified.") (emphasis in original).
65. Id.
66. See id. (arguing that expansion of the police officer's already significant discretionary pow-
ers should occur only once he has proven that his racial biases do not affect his work).
67. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 64.
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B. The Vagueness Doctrine
An exhaustive survey of the vagueness doctrine is beyond the scope
of this Note.68 However, a brief sketch of the doctrine's development
is necessary to illustrate its juxtaposition to community policing.
The vagueness doctrine is based on the due process requirements of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 69 The doctrine requires laws
to be clearly articulated by the legislature in an effort to make the
citizenry aware of the conduct that is prohibited and to assure their
even-handed and fair administration. 70 In demanding that laws be
specific, the judiciary ensures that the elected body, rather than the
police officer on his beat, defines misconduct.71 Specific laws present
the police and administrators of the law with guideposts that limit
their discretionary power: "The evils to be retarded are caprice and
whim, the misuse of government power for private ends, and the unac-
knowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection. '7 2
1. Early Cases
The United States Supreme Court developed the vagueness doc-
trine throughout the Nineteenth Century.73 The roots of the vague-
ness doctrine are not in the Constitution, but rather within the
judiciary's common-law practice of refusing to enforce legislative acts
that were too uncertain to be applied.7 4 For instance, in United States
v. Brewer,75 the Court reviewed a federal criminal statute that pun-
ished election officers for neglecting duties that had been imposed by
either state or federal law.7 6 The defendants were indicted under a
68. For an exhaustive survey, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
69. See Peter W. Poulos, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness and
Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 389 (1995).
70. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (calling the vagueness doctrine "the operational arm of legality").
71. Id. at 202.
72. Id. at 212.
73. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. Q.
195, 199 (1954).
74. See, e.g., Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831,
831 (1923) ("It is believed ... that in many of the cases in which legislation is declared of no
effect because of vagueness or uncertainty in the language used there is no need of tying the
conclusion to any particular constitutional inhibition."); Note, Void for Vagueness: An Escape
front Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 278 (1948) ("It should be emphasized that at this
time [late nineteenth century] the concept was still primarily a principle of construction and had
not yet received the sanctity of being associated with the constitutional requirement of due
process.").
75. 139 U.S. 278 (1891).
76. Id. at 279-80.
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state statute that required election officers to count ballots only after
the polls had closed. 77 The prosecution asked the Court to construe
the statute as requiring election officers to keep the ballot-box at the
polling place. 78 However, the Court refused, recognizing that laws
"which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to
their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid."'79 The
Court concluded, "[b]efore a man can be punished, his case must be
plainly and unmistakably within the statute."80
Subsequent cases brought vagueness decisions within the parame-
ters of the Constitution.8' In Connally v. General Construction Co.,82
the Court reviewed a state statute that made it a crime for a contrac-
tor performing government work to pay laborers less than the current
rate of wages in the locality where the work was performed. 83 A con-
tractor brought suit in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the stat-
ute on the theory that the uncertainty of the statute deprived him of
liberty and property without due process of law. 84 The Court's hold-
ing in Connally has become the classic formulation 85 of the vagueness
test:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what con-
duct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-
recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of
fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and dif-
77. Id. at 280-82. The statute read as follows in pertinent part:
Every officer of an election.., who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to
such election ... or who violates any duty so imposed; or who knowingly does any acts
thereby unauthorized, with intent to affect any such election, or result thereof; or who
fraudulently makes any false certificate of the result of such election ... shall be pun-
ished ....
Id. at 279-80.
78. Id. at 282.
79. Id. at 288.
80. 139 U.S. at 288 (citing U.S. v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1889)).
81. See Amsterdam, supra note 68, at 67 n.2.
Obviously, though, Supreme Court review of state criminal administration, which has
been the most significant sphere of operation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, can-
not be supported on principles deriving directly from natural law or the jus gentium;
whatever its initial origin, the doctrine must in these cases find its present foundation in
the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
82. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
83. Id. at 388.
84. Id. at 390.
85. See Poulos, supra note 69, at 390.
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fer as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.8
6
However, the above formulation was not applied to all laws.87 Prior
to the constitutional reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, the police per-'
formed an order maintenance function under the color of broad laws
that could include virtually anyone's conduct.88 The venerable Justice
Frankfurter expressed his concern over the order maintenance laws,
explaining, "[they] allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men to
be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prose-
cution, although not chargeable with any particular offense." 89 How-
ever, Justice Frankfurter's concern was not shared by a majority of the
Court.90
2. Constitutional Reform
By the 1960s, there was a clamoring throughout the legal commu-
nity for reform in the area of broad order maintenance laws.9' Com-
mentators railed against the laws' proneness for an assembly line type
justice that punished a person's status rather than his or her acts. 92
86. 269 U.S. at 391.
87. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 595 (explaining that the vagueness doctrine was not
strictly applied to broad order-maintenance laws prior to constitutional reforms).
88. Id.; see also Robert Force, Decriminalization of Breach of the Peace Statutes: A Nonpenal
Approach to Order Maintenance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 367, 399 (1972) (examining the use and abuse
of broad order-maintenance laws). Force argued that the interrelationship between the police
arrest power and broad, vaguely worded statutes created a "formidable weapon" for police be-
cause "if statutes are so encompassing that virtually any unconventional, improper, or immoral
conduct or status may arguably be included within their provisions, then the power to arrest is
concomitantly broad." Id. at 399 (emphasis in original). He concluded that, together, those twin
tendencies allowed the police to arrest anyone they wanted to arrest. Id.
89. 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 585-91. See generally William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy and
Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960) (focusing on the fact that vagrancy statutes were
almost exclusively enforced upon the poor and dissidents); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of
Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17, 30 (1968) (explaining that the sheer breadth of the
order maintenance laws allowed the police too much discretion).
92. See Force supra note 88, at 400 (recognizing that order maintenance cases were processed
in an inequitable fashion). Force illustrated the unjust atmosphere surrounding petty offenses
with the following quote from a New York City municipal judge:
The court system in New York City is so constructed that I cannot effectively operate as
a good judicial officer. The method of selection of judges there militates against getting
the best possible men, and after a judge is selected he is given no training whatsoever
except on-the-job training at the expense of the defendant. He is also faced with the
peculiar task of making workable with respect to an individual defendant a system to-
tally inefficient from an administrative standpoint .... The judges can spend no more
than one or two minutes in considering the question of bail with respect to any defen-
dant. Now, if that is justice, I'll eat my hat.
2000] CHICAGO v. MORALES
The case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville93 is the seminal case
that utilized the vagueness doctrine to invalidate the broad reach of
order maintenance laws.94
The eight defendants in Papachristou were convicted under a Jack-
sonville ordinance that encompassed everything from "persons who
use juggling or unlawful games or plays," to "persons neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame . . . . -95 In Papachristou the defendant Heath was
driving up to the residence of his girlfriend.96 The defendants noticed
that police were present at the residence, and they began backing out
of the driveway.97 The officers arrested both defendants under the
ordinance. 98 The co-defendant was charged with loitering because he
was standing in the driveway, despite the fact that he was standing
there at the command of the officers. 99
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas concluded that the "ordi-
nance was void for vagueness, both in the sense that it 'fail[ed] to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated con-
duct was forbidden by the statute,'100 and because it encourage[d] ar-
bitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."101 The Court observed
Id. at 400-01 n.175 (quoting MASS PRODUCTION JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL 147
(C. Whitebread ed. 1970) (emphasis in original). See generally Gary V. Dubin & Richard H.
Robinson, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered. Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1962) (finding that the courts handled an immense volume of these cases in
a short period of time, paying little attention to the state's evidentiary burden).
93. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
94. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 102 (1996)
(contending that Papachristou illustrates that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is one of the "most
important guarantees of liberty under law").
95. 405 U.S. at 156 n.1. The Jacksonville ordinance provided:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common
night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton
and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, per-
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitu-
ally living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants
and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished [by 90 days' imprison-
ment, a $500 fine, or both].
Id. (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA. ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57).
96. 405 U.S. at 160.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953)).
101. 405 U.S. at 162 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, MO U.S. 88 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1936)).
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that the ordinance served to criminalize conduct that was revered in
America. 102 "Persons 'wandering or strolling' from place to place
have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay." 10 3 Fur-
ther, Justice Douglas demonstrated that the Jacksonville stricture was
overinclusive, arguing that "[plersons 'neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting .. .places where
alcoholic beverages are sold and served' would literally embrace many
members of golf clubs and city clubs." 10 4 The stricture's broad indefi-
nite language prompted the Court to echo previous dicta that "[i]t
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to
step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should
be set at large."' 0 5 Justice Douglas observed that the general Jackson-
ville populace was not implicated by the ordinance's imprecise terms;
rather, "poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, [and] idlers-may be
required to comport themselves according to a life style deemed ap-
propriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts."' 1 6 Thus, the
Court concluded that the ordinance was plainly unconstitutional be-
cause it resulted "in a regime in which the poor and unpopular are
permitted to 'stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the whim of any
police officer .... ,"107
The Papachristou Court clearly stated that a police officer's un-
bounded authority under vague order maintenance statutes was un-
constitutional. 0 8 However, the Court was less explicit in determining
whether the police could constitutionally perform any type of order
maintenance function. 1 9 Consequently, the post Papachristou appli-
cation of the vagueness doctrine, especially in regard to order mainte-
nance laws, has been far from uniform. 10
102. 1d. at 164.
103. Id. at 164.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 165 (quoting U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)).
106. Id. at 170.
107. 405 U.S. at 170 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
108. Id.
109. See Livingston, supra note 29, at 602.
110. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687, 687 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that a statute proscribing "[n]o person shall saunter and loiter in a street in such a manner as to
obstruct or endanger travellers" was unconstitutionally vague because it lent too much discretion
to the police), with Watts v. Florida, 463 So. 2d 205, 206-07 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a statute
proscribing "loiter[ing] or prowl[ing] in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-
abiding individuals" was not unconstitutionally vague because the police had sufficient factors
on which to base their arrests).
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C. The Controversy
In May of 1992, the Committee on Police and Fire of the Chicago
City Council began to conduct hearings investigating the need for an
ordinance that would clear some of the neighborhood street corners
of gang-related congregations."' 1 Based on the hearings, the City
Council made a number of findings1 2 that were incorporated into the
Gang Congregation Ordinance. 13 The Ordinance passed on June 17,
11l. See CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL COMMITEE ON POLICE AND FIRE, TRANSCRIPTS OF PRO-
CEEDINGS (May 11, 1992). The origin of the Ordinance has been the subject of heated debate
because some scholars maintain that the Ordinance should not have been strictly construed if it
was backed by the community it would affect. Compare Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan,
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 197, 199 ("In response to voluminous citizen complaints about drive-by shootings,
fighting, and open-air drug dealing, Alderman William Beavers, the representative of a predomi-
nately black ward.., sought to introduce an ordinance to restrict gang-related congregations in
public ways in 1992."), with Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Proce-
dures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F.
215, 217 ("Concerned by the increasing presence of gangs like the 'Spanish Cobras' in their
neighborhoods .. .a community group based in a predominately white section of Chicago ...
negotiat[ed] with city officials about anti-gang legislation.").
112. The Council's findings were incorporated into the preamble of the Ordinance. The pre-
amble reads:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been exper-
iencing an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug related
crimes; and WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing increase
in criminal street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable
situation; and WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the bur-
geoning presence of street gang members in public places has intimidated many law
abiding citizens; and WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs
establish control over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating
others from entering those areas; and WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs
avoid arrest by committing no offense punishable under existing laws when they know
police are present, while maintaining control over identifiable areas by continued loi-
tering; and WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public
places by criminal street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of per-
sons and property in the area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism
often associated with such activity; and WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in
discouraging all persons from loitering in public places with criminal gang members;
and WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city's streets and other
public places so that the public may use such places without fear[.]
City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997) (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE
§ 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992)), cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1071 (1998), and aff'd 527 U.S. 41
(1999).
113. CHICAGO. ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1990) provides:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other per-
sons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area.
Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
As used in this section:
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1992, by a margin of thirty-one to seven." 14
Prior to enforcement of the Ordinance, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment promulgated General Order 92-4, in an attempt to guide the en-
forcement of the Ordinance." 5 The Order granted the authority to
make arrests of gang members under the Ordinance to sworn mem-
"Loiter" means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization, association in fact or
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its sub-
stantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in
paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have en-
gaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(3) "Criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted commission, or solicita-
tion of the following offenses, provided that the offenses are committed by two or more
persons, or by an individual at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal
street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal conduct
by gang members: The following sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 9-1 (murder),
9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 10-1 (kidnapping), 10-4 (forcible detention), subsection
(a)(13) of Section 12-2 (aggravated assault-discharging firearm), 12-4 (aggravated bat-
tery), 12-4.1 (heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a firearm), 12-4.3 (ag-
gravated battery of a child), 12-4.6 (aggravated battery of a senior citizen), 12-6
(intimidation), 12-6.1 (compelling organization membership of persons), 12-11 (home
invasion), 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), 18-1 (robbery), 18-2 (armed rob-
bery), 19-1 (burglary), 19-3 (residential burglary), 19-5 (criminal fortification of a resi-
dence or building), 20-4 (arson), 20-1.1 (aggravated arson), 20-2 (possession of
explosives or explosives or explosive or incendiary devices), subsections (a)(6), (a)(7),
(a)(9), or (a)(12) of Section 24-1 (unlawful use of weapons), 24-1.1 (unlawful use or
possession of weapons by felons or persons in the custody of the Department of Cor-
rections facilities), 24-1.2 (aggravated discharge of a firearm), subsection (d) of Section
25-1 (mob action-violence), 33-1 (bribery), 33A-2 (armed violence); Sections 5, 5.1, 7 or
9 of the Cannabis Control Act where the offense is a felony (manufacture or delivery of
cannabis, cannabis trafficking, calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy and related of-
fenses); or Sections 401, 401.1, 405, 406.1, 407 or 407.1 of the Illinois Controlled Sub-
stances Act (illegal manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, controlled
substance trafficking, calculated criminal drug conspiracy and related offenses).
(4) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" means two or more acts of criminal gang activity
of which at least two such acts were committed within five years of each other and at
least one such act occurred after the effective date of this section.
(5) "Public place" means the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violates this section is subject to a fine of not less than $100.00
and not more than $500.00 for each offense, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both.
In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person who violates this section
may be required to perform up to 120 hours of community service pursuant to Section
1-4-120 of this code.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1990).
114. See Official Journal of Proceedings, City of Chicago 18293 (June 17, 1992).
115. See Chicago Police Dep't., General Order No. 92-4 (Aug. 8, 1992). The Illinois Supreme
Court noted that representatives from both the Chicago police and law departments informed
the City Council that any limitations on the discretion police would have enforcing the Ordi-
nance would best be developed through police policy, rather than placing such limitations into
the Ordinance itself. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 59.
CHICAGO v. MORALES
bers of the Gang Crime Section and other youth officers with the
greatest knowledge of criminal street gangs. 116 The Order required
that the Ordinance be enforced in specific portions of Chicago where
loitering street gangs had posed a demonstrable problem for the sur-
rounding community. 117 In deciding which areas to designate, district
commanders were required to consult with knowledgeable members
of the department, appropriate community groups, crime pattern in-
formation, citizen complaints, police observations, local public offi-
cials, and other reliable members of the community.'18 Authorized
officers were required to order persons loitering in a designated area
to disperse and remove themselves from the area when there was
probable cause to believe that at least one of the persons was a mem-
ber of a criminal street gang. 19
For every arrest under the Ordinance, the Order required the ar-
resting officer to complete an arrest report which provided specific
reasons for concluding that the arrestee was a member of a gang or a
person loitering in a group with a gang member. t 20 The probable
cause to believe the arrestee was a gang member was to be substanti-
ated by the officer's experience and knowledge of the alleged offend-
ers, other reliable information like admission of membership, use of
gang symbols, or identification by other reliable informants. 121 Fur-
thermore, the Order required district commanders to maintain and
update gang information files that contained names of individuals that
the department had concluded were members of criminal street
gangs.' 22 The Order stated that this, and other gang information, was
to ensure that the police were working with specific facts, rather than
hunch and suspicion.'23
The City of Chicago (City) began to aggressively enforce the Ordi-
nance in August of 1992.124 From the beginning, most trial courts held
116. Chicago Police Dep't. General Order 92-4 at 2, 3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. id.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Chicago Police Dep't. General Order 92-4 at 2, 3. The Police Department must have
probable cause to believe the individuals were gang members. Id.
123. Id.
124. During the three years of the Ordinance's enforcement-August 1992 through Decem-
ber 1995-the police issued over 85,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people. See
RICHARD M. DALEY & TERRY HILLIARD, CITY OF CHICAGO GANG AND NARCOTIC RELATED
VIOLENT CRIME: 1993-1997, at 7 (June 1998). In its brief to the Court, the City maintained that
the Ordinance was directly responsible for a significant decline in gang-related homicides. See
Morales, 527 U.S. at 49 n.7. The City directed the Court's attention to statistics that showed that
the gang related homicide rate fell by 26 percent in 1995, the last year the Ordinance was en-
2000]
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the Ordinance unconstitutional. 25 The Illinois Appellate Court af-
firmed a trial court's ruling that the Ordinance was unconstitutional,
and affirmed other pending appeals accordingly.126 The City appealed
the consolidated decisions to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed and held that the Ordinance violated the Due Process Clause
because it was impermissibly vague on its face, and placed arbitrary
restriction on personal liberties. 27 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari.128
III. CHICAGO V. MORALES' 2 9
On June 10, 1999, the United States Supreme Court delivered a six
to three opinion affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that
the Ordinance was unconstitutional. 30 However, the votes were not
quietly cast; the issues raised in Morales produced a heated interplay
amongst the Justices, resulting in six opinions and a narrow holding.' 31
A. Sample of the Facts
This Note will examine five of the sixty-six fact patterns that were in
controversy before the Morales Court. 32 One fact pattern involved
"Jose Renteria-an admitted member of the Satan Disciples gang-
who was observed by the arresting officer loitering on a street corner
with other gang members."' 133 The officer issued a dispersal order, but
when the officer returned to the same corner twenty minutes later,
Renteria and his group were still present. 34
forced-this compared to an II percent increase in 1996, a year after the Ordinance was held
invalid. Id.
125. See Poulos, supra note 69, at 384 n.26 (citing trial court decisions).
126. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 661) N.E.2d 34, 42 (Il1. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (holding
that the Ordinance impaired the freedom of assembly of non-gang members in violation of the
First Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article I of the Illinois Constitution, that it was
unconstitutionally vague, that it improperly criminalized status rather than conduct, and that it
jeopardized the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution),
affd sub nom. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (111. 1997), aff d 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
127. 687 N.E.2d at 59.
128. See 523 U.S. 1071 (Apr. 20, 1998).
129. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 67 ("It is important to courts and legislatures alike that we characterize more
clearly the narrow scope of today's holding.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Each pattern is distinct from the rest, occurring in its own time and place.
Although this sampling may seem woefully incomplete without the facts of Jesus Morales' case,
his Appellate Court decision was unpublished, and could not be obtained by the author. City of
Chicago v. Morales, Nos. 1-93-4039, et al. (Ill. App. Ct., 1995), affd 687 N.E.2d 53 (111. 1997),
affd 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
133. 527 U.S. at 82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
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James Youkhana, Fernando Cota, Jose Merced, Roosevelt McMul-
lan, Jr., Johnny Newsome, Anthony Cordero, Julio Barroso, Hermie
Khamo, Lamont Jordan, Lisa Gonzales, and Florentine Soto were ar-
rested for violating the Ordinance. 135 According to the complaint
filed against the group, they were observed "loitering at 1433 W. Car-
men, a public place with one or more persons at least one of whom
was member [sic] of the Latin Kings criminal street gang, and . . .
failed to disperse and remove [themselves] from the area when or-
dered to do so .... ,,136
Another fact pattern involves "Daniel Washington and several
others-who admitted they were members of the Vice Lords gang-
were observed by the arresting officer loitering in the street, yelling at
passing vehicles, stopping traffic, and preventing pedestrians from us-
ing the sidewalks."'1 37 The officer issued two dispersal orders before
arresting the group under the Ordinance.1 38
Similarly, Sabrina Brown, Tasha White, and Renee Goodwill were
arrested and charged with violating the Ordinance because they were
standing in the vicinity of 1528 West Morse in Chicago.1 39 The arrest
report indicated that the defendants were all members of the Gang-
ster Disciples street gang. 40 Sabrina Smith's and Tasha White's arrest
reports stated that they were found loitering in the same area at 11:00
p.m. However, the complaint filed against the group alleged that after
being warned to leave the area at 9:45 p.m., the group was found loi-
tering in the same area at 10:00 p.m.' 41
Gregorio Gutierrez, an admitted member of the Latin Kings gang,
was observed by the arresting officer standing on the street corner
with two other men.1 42 The officer arrested the men under the Ordi-
nance after issuing a dispersal order, driving around the block, and
finding the group in the same place as before.1 43
135. 660 N.E.2d at 37.
136. Id. The Morales Court took notice of the fact that of the 66 respondents before it, 34 of
them were only accused of being in the presence of a gang member, not of being gang members
themselves. 527 U.S. at 63 n.34.
137. 527 U.S. at 82-83.
138. Id.
139. 660 N.E.2d at 37.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 527 U.S. at 83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
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B. The Legal Framework
The Court framed the general issue as "whether the Supreme Court
of Illinois correctly held that the Ordinance violate[d] the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion." 144 From that generality, Justice Stevens proceeded to lay a legal
framework that splintered into six differing opinions.
First, Justice Stevens recognized that a statute could be attacked on
its face under two different doctrines, overbreadth and vagueness. 45
"[T]he overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws
that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissi-
ble application of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'"1 46 Justice Stevens concluded
that the Ordinance did not have a "sufficiently substantial impact on
conduct protected by the First Amendment to render it unconstitu-
tional."'' 47 Justice Stevens contrasted a group of loitering gang mem-
bers with an assembly showing support or opposition to a point of
view, reasoning that the gang members' social contacts did "not im-
pair the First Amendment['s] 'right of association."' 1 48
Justice Stevens' ruling neared holding that the impact of the Ordi-
nance on the constitutional right to loiter was sufficient to support a
facial challenge under the overbreadth doctrine.149 However, he de-
144. Id. at 46. As mentioned, the vagueness doctrine is based in the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
145. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 52. A facial attack is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on
its face-that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (7th
ed. 1999).
146. 527 U.S. at 52 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973)). The main
rationale for the overbreadth doctrine "is to provide 'breathing space' for First Amendment
freedoms." See Poulos, supra note 70, at 392. The doctrine works from the premise that a per-
son's inability to discern whether a law will be invoked against his activity and whether such
activity will be protected by the courts will cause him to forgo his First Amendment rights alto-
gether. Id. Justice Marshall summed up the doctrine by stating:
That this Court will ultimately vindicate an employee if his speech is constitutionally
protected is of little consequence-for the value of the sword of Damocles is that it
hangs-not that it drops. For every employee who risks his job by testing the limits of
the statute, many more will choose the cautious path and not speak at all.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974).
With regard to facial challenges under the overbreadth doctrine, the Court has crafted a spe-
cialized exception to the general rule that the challenger prove the statute is unconstitutional in
all its applications; the Court has stated that such an exception is justified in light of the risk that
an overbroad statute will chill free expression. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-2 (stating
that it has "long been recognized" that the First Amendment needs breathing space).
147. 527 U.S. at 52-53.
148. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Gregory
v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-25 (1989)).
149. Id. at 55.
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clined, reasoning that it was "clear that the vagueness of this enact-
ment makes a facial challenge appropriate."'' 50 Justice Stevens
maintained that the Ordinance was subject to a facial attack under the
vagueness doctrine because it lacked a mens rea requirement and
therefore infringed upon constitutionally protected rights. 15'
In addition, Justice Stevens set forth the criteria to be used in judg-
ing the vagueness of the Ordinance, recognizing that "[v]agueness
may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons.
150. Id.
151. Id. Respondent's facial attack gave way to one of the more lively exchanges between the
Justices. In his dissent, Justice Scalia first called into question the very existence of facial invali-
dation in the federal courts:
The rationale for our power to review federal legislation for constitutionality, expressed
in Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S.] 1 Cranch 137, (1803), was that we had to do so in order
to decide the case before us. But that rationale only extends so far as to require us to
determine that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this party, in the circum-
stances of this case ... to go further and pronounce that the statute is unconstitutional
in all applications ... seems to me no more than an advisory opinion-which a federal
court should never issue at all... I think it quite improper, in short, to ask the constitu-
tional claimant before us: Do you just want us to say that this statute cannot constitu-
tionally be applied to you in this case, or do you want to go for broke and try to get the
statute pronounced void in all its applications'?
Id. at 74, 77.
Additionally, Justice Scalia stringently maintained that the Salerno standard-which estab-
lished that successful facial challenges to legislative acts must prove that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act could be valid-was controlling. 527 U.S. at 80. Justice Scalia took
exception to the plurality's stance that "many" other third-party rights must be infringed for a
statute to be facially invalid. Id. at 81. He noted that
in some recent facial-challenge cases The Court has, without any attempt at explana-
tion, created entirely irrational exceptions to the 'unconstitutional in every conceivable
application' rule when the statutes at issue concerned hot-button social issues on which
'informed opinion' was zealously united. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996)
(SCALIA, J., dissenting) (homosexual rights); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (abortion rights)).
Id. Justice Scalia concluded, "[b]ut the present case does not even lend itself to such a 'political
correctness' exception-which though illogical, is at least predictable. It is not a la mode to favor
gang members and associated loiterers over the beleagured law-abiding residents of the inner
city." Id.
Justice Scalia punctuated his opposition to the facial invalidation by expressing his outrage at
some of the respondents' inability to show that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to
them: "[T]he ultimate demonstration of the inappropriateness of the Court's holding of facial
invalidity is the fact that it is doubtful whether some of these respondents could even sustain an
as-applied challenge on the basis of the majority's own criteria." Id. at 82.
Justice Stevens answered "Justice Scalia's ... facial challenge to the facial challenge doctrine
." by concluding that "we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it
is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been a decisive factor in any decision of this
Court, including Salerno itself . I..." Id. at 56 n.22. He concluded that "Justice Scalia's assump-
tion that state courts must apply the restrictive Salerno test [was not only] incorrect as a matter
of law, [but it also] contradict[ed] the 'essential principles of federalism."' 527 U.S. at 55 n.22
(citing Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 284
(1994)).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:371
First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary
people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may author-
ize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' 152
C. The Majority and Police Discretion
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. 53 Justice
Stevens maintained that the "broad sweep of the ordinance also vio-
lat[ed] 'the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement."'' 154 He observed that the enactment's
language offered no guidance to the police; rather, it directed an of-
ficer "to issue an order without first making any inquiry about possi-
ble purposes."'155 Justice Stevens, a native Chicagoan, illustrated his
point with the following city scene:
It matters not whether the reason that a gang member and his fa-
ther, for example, might loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsus-
pecting fan or just get a glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the
ballpark; in either event, if their purpose is not apparent to a nearby
police officer, she may-indeed, she "shall"-order them to
disperse.156
Justice Stevens disagreed with the City's arguments that the Ordi-
nance limited police discretion. 157 He reasoned that the "'no appar-
ent purpose' standard for making that decision was inherently
subjective because its application depended on whether some purpose
[was] 'apparent' to the officer on the scene."'1 58 The majority was
troubled by the concept that an officer "would have discretion to treat
some purposes-perhaps a purpose to engage in idle conversation or
simply to enjoy a cool breeze on a warm evening-as too frivolous to
152. Id. at 56 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357). The Court and commentators have
maintained that the discretion-prong of the vagueness doctrine is the more important of the two.
See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ("[T]he more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is ... the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."); Jef-
fries, supra note 70, at 218 ("[T]he susceptibility of the law in question to arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement .... is the most persuasive justification for vagueness review generally.").
But see The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 276, 276 (1999)
(contending that by treating the discretion-prong in isolation, "the Court reached a result that
may be inappropriate to the specific facts and failed generally to recognize that discretion, no-
tice, and the implication of constitutional rights are inter-connected-not independent-aspects
of a single vagueness test").
153. 527 U.S. at 45.
154. Id. at 60 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 62.
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be apparent if he suspected a different ulterior motive. ' 159 Further-
more, Justice Stevens maintained that the Ordinance's gang member
requirement placed an insufficient limit on the authority to disperse
because the Ordinance could be applied to gang and non-gang mem-
bers alike: "Friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total
strangers might unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering if they hap-
pen to engage in idle conversation with a gang member." 160
Justice Stevens noted that the Ordinance had the "perverse conse-
quence of excluding from its coverage much of the intimidating con-
duct that motivated its enactment."' 16 He reasoned that "the most
harmful gang loitering is motivated either by an apparent purpose to
publicize the gang's dominance of certain territory, . . . or ... to con-
ceal [an] ongoing commerce in illegal drugs."1 62
The majority opinion concluded by dismissing the City's argument
that the Order, which accompanied the Ordinance's enforcement, was
sufficient to limit police discretion.1 63 The majority reasoned that the
Order was adopted internally, and would not provide a defense for a
loiterer who was arrested outside the area specified by the Order. 164
D. The Plurality and Insufficient Notice
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion that was joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg which maintained that the Ordinance failed to give Chi-
cagoans notice of what it criminalized. 165 "It is difficult to imagine
how any citizen of the city of Chicago standing in a public place with a
group of people would know if he or she had an 'apparent purpose.'
If she were talking to another person would she have an apparent
purpose?"' 166 Justice Stevens disagreed with the City's contention that
the police dispersal order provided individuals with sufficient notice,
observing that an unjustified dispersal order would constitute an im-
pairment of liberty. 67 Justice Stevens was concerned that an officer
159. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 62.
160. Id. at 63.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 527 U.S. at 56.
166. Id. at 56-57.
167. Id. at 58. Justice Stevens stated that: [i]f the police are able to decide arbitraily which
members of the public they will order to disperse, then the Chicago ordinance becomes indistin-
guishable from the law we held invalid in Shiutlesworth v. Birmingham." Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens illustrated this by demonstrating that "Literally read ... this ordinance says that
a person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of
that city. The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration." Id. at n.29.
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could issue a dispersal order after the prohibited conduct had already
occurred; therefore, he concluded that the Ordinance could not "pro-
vide the kind of advance notice that will protect the putative loiterer
from being ordered to disperse."'' 68
Justice Stevens also found that the dispersal order was vague in its
own right. He asked: "[H]ow long must the loiterers remain apart?
How far must they move?"' 169 While recognizing that the nondescript
dispersal order did not render the Ordinance unconstitutional, Justice
Stevens maintained the plurality's conclusion that the Ordinance
failed to give citizens notice of what was prohibited under the
Ordinance. 170
In addition to finding that the Ordinance provided insufficient no-
tice, the plurality concluded that the freedom to loiter was part of an
individual's liberty subsumed in the Due Process Clause. 17 1 Justice
Stevens wrote, "it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain
in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the
freedom of movement inside frontiers that is 'a part of our
heritage.' "172
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Breyer joined.' 73 Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that the
Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because "any person standing
on the street has a general 'purpose'-even if it is simply to stand-
the ordinance permits police officers to choose which purposes are
permissible."'' 74 However, Justice O'Connor was careful to point out
that there remained alternative ways to "combat the very real threat
168. Id. at 59.
169. 527 U.S. at 59.
170. Id. at 59-60.
171. Id. at 53. Unsurprisingly, the plurality's substantive due process analysis drew barbed
responses from the dissenters. "For the plurality, however, the historical practices of our people
are nothing more than a speed bump on the road to the 'right' result." Id. at 84 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
The plurality's sweeping conclusion that this ordinance infringes upon a liberty interest
... withers when exposed to relevant history .... The plurality's contrary assertion calls
to mind the warning that "[t]he Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law hav-
ing little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution."
Id. at 103-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J. dissenting)).
172. Id. at 54 (citing and quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
173. 527 U.S. at 64.
174. Id. at 66.
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posed by gang intimidation and violence."'' 75 She noted that the
Court properly distinguished the Ordinance "from laws that require
loiterers to have a 'harmful purpose,' from laws that target gang mem-
bers only, and from laws that incorporate limits on the area and man-
ner in which the laws may be enforced. '1 76
Justice O'Connor concluded by noting that the Illinois Supreme
Court had misapplied Supreme Court precedent when reasoning that
it was required to hold the Ordinance vague because it was intention-
ally drafted in a vague manner. 77 She maintained that the Court had
never held that the intent of the drafters should be used to determine
if a law was vague.178 Despite Justice O'Connor's reasoning, she con-
cluded that the Court "cannot impose a limiting construction that a
state supreme court has declined to adopt."'17 9
F. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy was not persuaded by the City's argument that a
police officer's order had to be disobeyed to be in violation of the
Ordinance. 80 Justice Kennedy recognized situations when a police
officer's unexplained order would have to be obeyed. 81 However, he
reasoned that it did not follow "that any unexplained police order
must be obeyed without notice of the lawfulness of the order."'' 82 Jus-
tice Kennedy observed that a person engaged in innocent conduct was
not likely to know when he was subject to a dispersal order under the
Ordinance because the order was largely based on the officer's knowl-
edge of the people in a group. 183
G. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer took exception to Justice Scalia's dissent. First, Jus-
tice Breyer maintained that the Ordinance created more than what
Justice Scalia characterized as a "'minor limitation upon the free state
of nature,"' because the Ordinance granted police unlimited discre-
175. Id. at 67.
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 68.
178. Id.
179. 527 U.S. at 68 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355-56 n.4).
180. Id. at 69.
181. Id. ("Illustrative examples include when the police tell a pedestrian not to enter a build-
ing and the reason is to avoid impeding a rescue team.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 69-70.
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tion to close off major portions of the city to innocent people. 84 Sec-
ond, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention that the
majority had violated the rules governing facial challenges. 85 Justice
Breyer maintained that the facial invalidation was wholly legitimate
because the police enjoyed too much discretion under the Ordinance
in every case.18 6 He reasoned that if every application of the Ordi-
nance represented an exercise of boundless discretion, then the Ordi-
nance was invalid in all of its applications. 18 7 Justice Breyer concluded
by noting that the City had constitutional alternatives; or because "the
Constitution might well have permitted the city to apply [a more spe-
cific ordinance] ... to circumstances like those present here."' 88
H. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that the Ordinance was sim-
ply a local government legitimately exercising its police power. 8 9 He
analogized the Ordinance to speed limit laws that infringe upon the
freedoms of all, but are nevertheless considered constitutional. 90
Furthermore, Justice Scalia questioned the constitutional legitimacy of
a facial challenge, not only in the instant case, but in all cases. 19t In
his assessment, Justice Scalia thought it would be
quite improper ... to ask the constitutional claimant before us: Do
you just want to ask us to say that this statute cannot constitution-
ally be applied to you in this case, or do you want to go for broke
and try to get the statute pronounced void in all of its
applications?' 92
Justice Scalia railed against the plurality's recognition of a constitu-
tional right to loiter. "The plurality tosses around the term 'constitu-
tional right' in [a] renegade sense, because there is not the slightest
evidence for the existence of a genuine constitutional right to loi-
ter."' 93 He contended that the plurality short circuited the recently
established substantive due process analysis, concluding that "the his-
184. Id. at 70. Justice Breyer further noted that: "To grant a policeman virtually standardless
discretion to close off major portions of the city to an innocent person is, in my view, to create a
major, not a 'minor,' 'limitation on the free state of nature."' Id. at 70.
185. 527 U.S. at 71.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 73.
189. Id. at 73-74.
190. Id. at 73.
191. 527 U.S. at 74. See supra note 151 (providing an extensive account of Justice Scalia's
argument and Justice Stevens' response regarding facial challenges).
192. 527 U.S. at 77.
193. Id. at 84.
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torical practices of our people are nothing more than a speed bump on
the road to the 'right' result."' 94
In addition to attacking some of the majority and plurality's stances
on collateral issues, Justice Scalia attacked the Court's vagueness anal-
ysis. 195 First, he contended that the plurality's concern over the Ordi-
nance's insufficient notice was unfounded.1 96  To Justice Scalia,
"[w]hat counts for purposes of vagueness analysis... [is] the refusal to
obey a dispersal order, as to which there is no doubt of adequate no-
tice of the prohibited conduct. 1 97 Second, Justice Scalia disagreed
with the majority conclusion that the Ordinance provided insufficient
standards for the police.1 98 He contended that the Ordinance's re-
quirement that the police officer reasonably believe a loitering group
contained a gang member resembled the probable cause standard.1 99
Further, Justice Scalia noted that the probable cause standard was
made explicit in the Order, as a result, he concluded that the twin
tendencies of the Ordinance and the Order gave the Chicago Police
sufficient standards to guide their arrests.200
Justice Scalia punctuated his dissent by reiterating his contention
that the Ordinance represented a simple act of the democratic major-
ity in Chicago. 201 He casted the Ordinance in terms of a trade that the
majority was willing to make, concluding that the "Court has no busi-
ness second-guessing either the degree of necessity or the fairness of
the trade. '202
194. Id.
195. Id. at 90-91.
196. Id. at 90.
197. Id. Justice Scalia continued:
The plurality's suggestion that even the dispersal order itself is unconstitutionally
vague, because it does not specify how far to disperse (!) . . . scarcely requires a re-
sponse. If it were true, it would render unconstitutional for vagueness many Presiden-
tial proclamations issued under that provision of the United States Code which requires
the President, before using the militia or the Armed Forces for law enforcement, to
issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse. President Eisenhower's proc-
lamation relating to the court-ordered enrollment of black students in public schools at
Little Rock, Arkansas, read as follows: "I . . . command all persons engaged in such
obstruction of justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse forthwith."
527 U.S. at 91 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
198. Id. at 91.
199. Id. at 92.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 97.
202. Id. at 98.
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1. Justice Thomas' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.203 Justice Thomas disagreed with
the Court's position that the Ordinance gave police officers too much
discretion. "[T]he ordinance merely enabl[ed] police officers to fulfill
one of their traditional functions .... In their role as peace officers,
the police long have had the authority and the duty to order groups of
individuals who threaten the public peace to disperse. '20 4 Justice
Thomas argued that police performed a peace-keeping function, and
necessarily had to exercise some discretion in the execution of their
duties.20 5 He contended that the law could not constrain police ac-
tion, thus concluding that such an approach could not "be reconciled
with common sense, longstanding police practice, or this Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 20 6
Justice Thomas also took issue with the idea that the Ordinance
failed to give citizen's notice of what was forbidden. 20 7 He subscribed
to the view of Justice White: "If any fool would know a particular
category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute, if there
is an unmistakeable core that a reasonable person would know is for-
bidden by the law, the enactment is not unconstitutional on its
face. ' 208 Justice Thomas argued that any fool would know whether or
not he was within the Ordinance's proscription, noting that the plural-
ity was underestimating the intellectual capacity of the citizens of
Chicago. 20 9
Finally, Justice Thomas summarized the impact of the majority
decision:
Today, the Court focuses extensively on the "rights" of gang mem-
bers and their companions. It can safely do so-the people who will
have to live with the consequences of today's opinion do not live in
our neighborhoods .... By focusing exclusively on the imagined
"rights" of the two percent, the Court today has denied our most
vulnerable citizens the very thing that Justice Stevens elevates
above all else-the "freedom of movement." And that is a
shame.210
203. 527 U.S. at 98.
204. Id. at 106-07.
205. Id. at 109.
206. Id. at 109-10.
207. i. at 112.
208. /d. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 370-71 (White, J., dissenting)).
209. 527 U.S. at 114.
210. Id. at 114-15 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Morales
surprised the legal community. 211 Some commentators speculated
that the Court would take the opportunity to clarify its murky vague-
ness doctrine.212 Alternatively, some critics guessed that the Court
would address the growing number of community-policing measures
that cede certain liberties in exchange for greater police protection. 21 3
Unfortunately, the Court failed to address either issue, and as a conse-
quence, left hundreds2t 4 of jurisdictions speculating on questions that
were ripe for review. Jurisdictions questioned whether the police
could constitutionally be granted discretion to perform an order main-
tenance functions, and whether freedoms could be traded for in-
creased police protection. Rather than responding to the national
questions present in Morales, the Court reproduced its familiar vague-
ness analysis, leaving only hints and references to burning questions.
The amount of discretion the Ordinance lent to the police officer on
his beat was limitted by the General Police Order 92-4. In ignoring
the constraining effects of the Order, the Court exaggerated the
amount of discretion that Chicago Police exercised under the Ordi-
nance. The police must be given some measure of discretion so that
they are able to perform an order maintenance function in the com-
munities that pine for order and normalcy. The Court's treatment of
Chicago as a community was unfavorable because the Ordinance was
a community solution to a community problem. Yet, the Court did
not review the Ordinance, by way of the Order, from the perspective
of the community that supported the Ordinance.
A. How Much Discretion Can The Community Afford The Police?
The Papachristou Court issued a broad legislative directive to enact
penal statutes that did not allow for discriminatory enforcement. 215
However, the Papachristou opinion did not address whether the Con-
stitution afforded police any discretion to generally maintain order in
public places. 21 6 Papachristou and the vigorous application of the
211. See, e.g., Toni Massaro, The Gang's Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 25, 26 (1998) ("Far more
surprising was the United States Supreme Court's decision granting certiorari on Morales.").
212. Id. "One possible reading of the grant of certiorari is that the Court wishes to clarify its
murky (indeed opaque) vagueness doctrine ..... Id.
213. Id. ("[Tlhe grant of certiorari might signal the Court's desire to review more generally
the increasingly prevalent grants of broad discretionary authority to urban police, and the 'bro-
ken windows' refrain that is being intoned in support of these measures.").
214. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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vagueness doctrine left courts, legislatures, and police with no uniform
guide for how much discretion a statute could give a police officer.2 17
This uncertainty posed a special problem for community policing be-
cause one of the movement's tenets is a police force that is present in
the community to spontaneously fix problems.218 Morales presented
the Court with an opportunity to inform community-police jurisdic-
tions how much discretion they could constitutionally afford their po-
lice. 219 As can be seen by the outcome of Morales, this opportunity
was wasted.
1. The Justices Balk at Specifics
The Morales majority held that the Ordinance was vague because it
"necessarily entrust[ed] lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judg-
ment of the policeman on his beat. ' '22°1 The majority reasoned that the
''no apparent purpose" standard for determining who was loitering
was inherently subjective because it left the officer to determine
whether a loiterer had an apparent purpose.221 Justice O'Connor clar-
ified the majority's "inherently subjective" position slightly by reason-
ing that some degree of police discretion was necessary to allow the
police to perform their peace-keeping function.2 22  However,
O'Connor maintained that the "no apparent purpose" standard
granted the police too much discretion because the Ordinance permit-
ted the police to decide which purposes were permissible.223
The Court and Justice O'Connor's line of reasoning implies that the
police are not entitled to any discretion. However, if the Court will
not entrust lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the po-
liceman on his beat, then a policeman's subjective judgment has been
identified as an ill in itself. Thus, the majority's conclusion directs leg-
islatures and courts toward enacting and construing strictures that
would enable the police to perform their peacekeeping function with
robotic precision. The Court sets an impractical standard, offering lit-
tle to refute the inference that the police cannot be granted any sort of
discretion.
Justice Thomas argued on the other end of the spectrum. He main-
tained that rather than allotting an unconstitutional amount of discre-
217. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
219. The Court has kept the doctrine flexible by couching it in generalities like "the Constitu-
tion does not require impossible standards." United States v. Perillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
220. 527 U.S. at 110.
221. Id. at 62.
222. Id. at 65.
223. Id.
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tion, the Ordinance merely enabled the police to perform their
traditional function of preserving the public peace.224 He reasoned
that the Court had always entrusted officers with their own judgments
in making "spur-of-the-moment determinations" about whether or
not there was "probable cause," or "reasonable suspicion. '225 In his
view, the Court's hesitation in trusting the police officer's moment-to-
moment judgment could not "be reconciled with common sense, long-
standing police practice, or this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." 226
Justice Thomas' opinion did nothing more than refute an extreme
position with an equally extreme position. His reply was conclusory,
offering no reasons to explain why trust in police judgment was justi-
fied, rather, he simply concluded it was. In this light, Justice Thomas'
riposte boils down to a sort of "yes we can" to the Court's "no we
cannot." The Morales opinions left an inquiring public with little
more than the extreme stances on the perplexing issue of police
discretion.
The community policing movement needed an informed middle-
ground. For instance, Justice O'Connor should have gone beyond
merely recognizing the police's peace-keeping function; she should
have gone on to define the police discretion that would necessarily be
involved in that function. Likewise, Justice Thomas should have gone
beyond merely defining roles that already allow the police discretion.
Justice Thomas should have recognized that the "no apparent pur-
pose" standard was possibly more amorphous than the probable cause
standard. If the Justices had moved past the conclusional, courts and
legislatures would have had some benchmark with which to measure
the amount of discretionary judgment police are allowed. Since the
224. Id. at 101-02. Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas looked to history in support of his conclu-
sion that the police have a public maintenance function. He quoted the following passage from
the 1887 Police Manual for the City of New York:
It is hereby made the duty of the Police Force at all times of day and night, and the
members of such Force are hereby thereunto empowered, to especially preserve the
public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and insur-
rections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages, and assemblages which obstruct
the free passage of public streets, sidewalks, parks and places.
Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
225. 527 U.S. at 109-10.
Just as we trust officers to rely on their experience and expertise in order to make spur-
of-the-moment determinations about amorphous legal standards such as 'probable
cause' and 'reasonable suspicion,' so we must trust them to determine whether a group
of loiterers contains individuals ... whom the city has determined threatens the public
peace.
Id. (citing Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 695, 700 (1996)).
226. Id. at 110.
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Court failed to take such an approach, communities are left guessing
as to the amount of discretion they can lend their police to keep the
public peace.
2. The Justices' Short Shrift on Discretion
The Court's failure with regard to discretion was disappointing;
however, the disappointment was aggravated by the Court's disregard
of General Order 92-4. The City attempted to correct potential dis-
cretionary vagueness with the Order.227 However, the Court paid the
City's effort little heed, missing an opportunity to give guidance on an
innovative and effective way to limit police discretion.228
Surprisingly, the Court did not address in any detail whether or not
internal orders like General Order 92-4 sufficiently limited police dis-
cretion. 229 Rather, the majority confined its analysis of the Order to a
conclusion: "[The Order] would not provide a defense to a loiterer
who might be arrested [outside the designated areas]. Nor could a
person who knowingly loitered with a well-known gang member any-
where in the city safely assume that they would not be ordered to
disperse .... ",231) In short, the Court roundly concluded that the Chi-
cago police may not follow their own internal rules.
Ultimately, the Court's conclusion was legitimate. The Ordinance
and the Order both failed to address how each was related to the
other. The defendant who was arrested outside a nominated gang-
plagued area, or the defendant who was arrested by an unauthorized
officer, may not have had a defense in court because the Order was
not explicitly incorporated into the Ordinance. 23t Yet, however co-
gent the Court's conclusion, it should have at least recognized the Or-
der's curative effects, or at the very least, distinguished precedent that
makes its holding problematic.
227. Chicago Police Dep't. General Order 92-4 at 1.
228. 527 U.S. at 63.
229. Id. Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which police can be delegated the authority
to develop rules guiding their arrest discretion in the enforcement of criminal laws. Compare
Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: A Brief Rejoinder, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
1172, 1174-79 (1977) (contending that police should be required to enforce laws as provided by
the legislature), and Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Prin-
ciples and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 76-81, 86-98 (1976) (arguing that seperation of
powers and nondelegation prohibit police rulemaking that affects the scope of a criminal law, at
least in absence of explicit legislative authorization "accompanied by precise standards")
(quoted material at 98), with Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement:
A Reply. 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1167, 1168-70 (1977) (arguing that police inherently have the au-
thority to promulgate rules regulating arrest discretion).
230. 527 U.S. at 63-64.
231. Id.
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The Court failed to address authority that was clearly on point.
"Administrative interpretation and implementation of a regulation
are ... highly relevant to our [vagueness] analysis, for '[i]n evaluating
a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must ... consider any
limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has
proffered.'1,232 Even closer to the mark, "administrative regulations
'will often suffice to clarify a standard with an otherwise uncertain
scope.' "233
The Court was remiss in not addressing the above authority because
administrative regulations are useful for community policing measures
like the Ordinance. Regulations allow the police to tailor ordinances
to the very specific and changing needs of the community. For in-
stance, the Order limited enforcement of the Ordinance to portions of
the City where gangs had posed a demonstrable problem.2 34 The City
Council could not possibly have reached that kind of specificity be-
cause that limitation can change rapidly. The Order was extremely
useful because the district commanders, with the help of knowledgea-
ble community members, could specifically tailor the Ordinance to the
areas of the city that had an immediate gang problem, leaving unaf-
fected communities outside the Ordinance's necessarily broad
sweep.235 Thus, the Order allowed a constrained police force to spon-
taneously respond to community nominated problems.
The Court should have instructed Chicago on how to constitution-
ally utilize administrative regulations. Regrettably, the Court's curt
treatment of the Order leaves Chicago and other community-police
jurisdictions uninformed. These communities can only hope that the
Order was insufficient because the defendants could not utilize it in
court. If this proposition is true, then jurisdictions could simply incor-
porate the regulations into their statutes, allowing the police force to
adapt to the changing neighborhoods, while being ever-constrained in
the exercise of their discretion.
3. Compounding Actual Police Discretion
The Supreme Court's failure to review General Order 92-4 caused
the Court to exaggerate the actual discretion the Ordinance afforded
the police. For example, in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor main-
tained that the "no apparent purpose" standard allowed "[a]ny police
232. Id. at 92 n.10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
795-96 (1989)).
233. Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 504).
234. See Chicago Police Dep't General Order 92-4 at 2, 3.
235. Id.
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officer in Chicago ... to order at his whim any person standing in a
public place with a suspected gang member to disperse. '236 She con-
tinued, "the ordinance applies to hundreds of thousands of persons
who are not gang members, standing on any sidewalk or in any park,
coffee shop, [or] bar .... *"237 This is representative of the Court's
gross mischaracterization of the discretion the Ordinance afforded the
police. 238 Both Justice O'Connor and the Court asserted that the Or-
dinance allowed the police city-wide discretion to disperse loiterers;
however, both the Court and Justice O'Connor omitted General Or-
der 92-4 from their analyses. 239
The Order was promulgated to ensure that the Ordinance was not
enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.2 40 The purpose of the
Order was to limit the enforcement of the Ordinance to authorized
officers, who had a special understanding of gangs and gang member-
ship,24' and to the communities that were experiencing a gang prob-
lem. 242 The Order required that the enforcing officer have probable
cause to think that one of the loiters was a gang member.2 43 The
probable cause was to be based not only on the officer's experience
and knowledge of the alleged offenders, but also on documented in-
formation such as reliable witness testimony, reputed gang colors,
signs, or other markings. 244 Therefore, the Order placed numerous
limitations on police discretion.
Contrary to Justice O'Connor's assertion, any person standing with
a suspected gang member could not be ordered to disperse; the police
were required to have probable cause to believe that at least one per-
son in the group was a gang member. Furthermore, a person was not
subject to dispersal from any park, coffee shop, or bar. The Ordi-
nance could only be enforced in portions of the City where gang loi-
236. 527 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
237. Id. (second and third emphasis added).
238. "The Court" is referred to because the majority characterized the Ordinance similarly:
But this ordinance, for reasons that are not explained in the findings of the city council,
requires no harmful purpose and applies to nongang members as well as suspected gang
members. It applies to everyone in the city who may remain in one place with one
suspected gang member as long as their purpose is not apparent to an officer observing
them. Friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers might unwittingly
engage in forbidden loitering if they happen to engage in idle conversation with a gang
member.
Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
239. See id.
240. See Chicago Police Dep't. General Order 92-4 at I.
241. Id. at 2, 3.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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tering posed a demonstrable problem for the surrounding community.
Finally, not just any Chicago police officer could give a valid dispersal
order under the Ordinance. Only officers who had special knowledge
of gangs could give dispersal orders and make arrests under the
Ordinance.
In the wake of Morales, communities questioning the amount of dis-
cretion their police force can constitutionally be afforded are left to
rely on individual policemen and women to help them in their daily
lives.245 Here, the Order offered a compromise between the ills of
police discretion and the community need for police aid. Unfortu-
nately, the Court failed to offer guidance. First, the Court was unin-
formative with regard to the measure of discretion allowed to a
policeman on his beat. Second, the Court balked at the opportunity
to review an innovative administrative means of police restraint. Fi-
nally, the Court inflated the discretion afforded the police under the
Ordinance because it refused to recognize any of the Order's curative
effects. Morales represented a distinct opportunity for the legal bases
of community policing to be spelled out, but the opportunity passed
unrealized.
B. Can Communities Exchange Freedoms For Police Protection
The community policing movement calls for a police force that will
be present in the community to spontaneously maintain order.246
Parts of the legal community speculated that the Morales Court would
review the questionable constitutionality of the movement's call, and
contend that communities could not trade in liberties for increased
police protection.247 While the Court did not take up the issue di-
rectly, Justice Stevens' plurality, and Justice Scalia's dissent, brought
the opposing sides of the contentious topic248 into sharp relief. Jus-
245. A Chicago resident shared the following with the City Council:
I have never had the terror that I feel every day when I walk down the streets of
Chicago .... I have had my windows broken out. I have had guns pulled on me. I
have been threatened. I get intimidated on a daily basis, and it's come to the point
where I say, well, do I go out today. Do I put my ax in my briefcase. Do I walk around
dressed like a bum so I am not looking rich or got any money or anything like that.
1 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TIHE CITY COUNCIL OF CHICAGO, COMMITEE ON PO-
LICE AND FIRE 124-25 (May 11, 1992).
246. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 211, at 26 (predicting that the Court granted certiorari in
order to pass judgment on the community policing movement).
248. Compare, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 10 (1997) ("Some crit-
ics attack as racist police crackdowns on violent gangs because such actions will disproportion-
ately affect black members ... [b]ut are black communities hurt by police crackdowns on violent
gangs or helped by the destabilization of gangs that terrorize those who live in their midst?"),
and Kahan and Meares, supra note 28, at 1163 ("[B]ecause crime disrupts so many social institu-
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tice Stevens recognized a constitutional right to loiter, signaling that
Chicago communities were trading in on a right that was too valua-
ble.249 In contrast, Justice Scalia perceived loiterers' rights to be mini-
mal at best, contending that such minimal rights could be freely traded
as the community saw fit.250 Justice Stevens erred on the side of pro-
tecting the loiterers' freedoms, while Justice Scalia erred on the side of
protecting the communities democratic will, each erring at the ex-
pense of the other's concern.
Both of the Justices' concerns were legitimate. Justice Stevens wor-
ried that the community had had a valuable right unwittingly traded
away by the City Council. Justice Scalia was disturbed that the City
Council was not being allowed to passionately assert its will. 251 While
the Justices' positions seemed diametrically opposed, they were simi-
lar in the respect that they both viewed the problem from the perspec-
tive of the City Council.252 However, this is also the source of the
problem. The Justices should have taken the Order into account be-
cause it would have allowed them to analyze the Ordinance from the
communities' perspective.2 53 Additionally, the Justices would have
found that the Order balanced their competing concerns by affording
the aggressive Ordinance only to those communities that wanted its
protection. 254
1. Concerns of Justices Stevens and Scalia
While the Court failed to give specific guidance to communities
wishing to allow their police force greater authority in their neighbor-
hood, Justice Stevens' plurality, and Justice Scalia's dissent, offer two
very different perspectives on the issue. After recognizing the param-
eters of their extreme positions, the underlying concerns of the jus-
tices become apparent.
tions, many African-American citizens see rampant crime as one of the most substantial impedi-
ments to improving their economic and social class .... [which] translates into a demand ... for
higher levels of law enforcement."), with Stewart, supra note 53, at 2257 ("[If allowed greater
discretion], police officers in fact might be motivated by bias, [and] a 'broken windows' philoso-
phy could intensify acrimony between police officers and minority communities."), and David
Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinc-
tion," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2558 (1995) ("[l]ncarceration-especially on such a massive scale in a
well-defined community-is far from an adequate solution, and may well exacerbate the
problems associated with .. .crime.").
249. 527 U.S. at 53-54.
250. Id. at 94.
251. See discussion infra notes 265-272 and accompanying text.
252. See discussion infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
253. See discussion infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
254. See discussion infra notes 273-281 and accompanying text.
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a. A Fundamental Right to Loiter
Justice Stevens implicitly rejected the idea that a community can
trade certain freedoms for more police protection. This rejection can
be inferred from his recognition that "the freedom to loiter for inno-
cent purposes is part of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 55 The elevation of loitering
to a fundamental right by Justice Stevens made it incumbent on the
City of Chicago to show the Court that its law was necessary to
achieve a compelling objective. 256 Thus, Justice Stevens rejected the
idea that Chicagoans could trade in the right to loiter for clear street
corners because Chicagoans would be trading on a fundamental
right.257
Extending full constitutional protection to loitering seems to be a
stretch, a thought buttressed by Justice Stevens' minimal support.258
However, the plurality opinion represented the concern for individual
resident's rights under the Ordinance. The opinion's bold position
stood in rebuke to the contention that the Ordinance had support
from the communities that would be affected. Justice Stevens' vigor-
ous protection of the communities' freedoms signaled his concern that
some residents would involuntarily lose important rights under the
Ordinance.
b. A Free Exercise of Community Will
Justice Scalia viewed the Ordinance as a simple act of the public will
in reaction to a problem that faced the community.25 9 For Justice
Scalia, the Ordinance was a prophylactic measure that reasonably in-
255. 527 U.S. at 253.
256. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (explaining that the more exacting compel-
ling interest standard requires the state to show that the classification created by the state statute
is necessary to promote a compelling state interest). The Court employs a strict judicial scrutiny
when a fundamental right is implicated by a statute. See id. Strict scrutiny has long been viewed
as an insurmountable hurdle. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (noting that
many view the Court's strict scrutiny review as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"); see also
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (com-
menting on the outcome-determinative effect of the Court's strict scrutiny analysis).
257. 527 U.S. at 53-54.
258. Id. at 103-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Tellingly, the plurality cites only three cases in
support of the asserted right to 'loiter for innocent purposes' ... [and] only one ... addressed the
validity of a vagrancy ordinance ... [and it] did not undertake the now-accepted analysis applied
in substantive due process cases .... ).
259. Id. at 73. Justice Scalia drew the following analogy:
The citizens of Chicago were once free to drive about the city at whatever speed they
wished. At some point Chicagoans (or perhaps Illinoisans) decided this would not do,
and imposed prophylactic speed limits designed to assure safe operation by the average
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fringed upon the freedoms of all, in order to liberate the street corners
from the presence of unruly gangs. 260 Justice Scalia contended that
the City of Chicago could legitimately proscribe loitering in a whole-
sale fashion because loitering was of no constitutional significance. 26'
He reasoned that the infringement of protected rights, like speech or
religion, would cause such a prophylactic measure to be called into
question, but remaining in one place was not so protected.262 He con-
cluded, "it is up to the citizens of Chicago-not us-to decide whether
the trade off is worth it.' '263 Thus, underlying Justice Scalia's stance
was a concern for the community's right to passionately assert its will
in order to fix a problem.
As evidenced above, Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia's difference
in opinion was great. However, their opinions shared a similarity,
both focused on the problem from the perspective of the City Council.
For instance, Justice Stevens was concerned that the City Council was
trading away the citizens' rights. From the same perspective, Justice
Scalia was concerned that the majority will, as voiced in the City
Council, was being silenced. Indeed, both Justices analyzed this pro-
gressive stricture from an age-old perspective, and consequently,
failed to move beyond an age-old division. This Ordinance should
have been analyzed from a new perspective because community polic-
ing strictures recast law enforcement in light of its relationship to the
community. For example, the Ordinance was engendered by, written
for, and reliant on Chicago communities. 264 Naturally, a searching
analysis should be keen to the tendencies of community action, rather
than those of a governing body.
2. A Balancing of Concerns
Concomitant with the vision of an orderly neighborhood is the need
for a police force that is present in the neighborhood and able to spon-
taneously fix problems that threaten the order.265 The new commu-
nity-policing framework features a police role that is juxtaposed to the
role that police had throughout the Twentieth Century.266 During the
(or perhaps even subaverage) driver with the average (or perhaps even subaverage)
vehicle. This infringed upon the "freedom" of all citizens, but was not unconstitutional.
hi.
260. Id. at 73-74.
261. Id. at 84, 94.
262. 527 U.S. at 84.
263. Id. at 94.
264. See infra notes 277-280 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
266. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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reform era, police isolated themselves from the community and
founded their legitimacy on the narrow mandate to respond to infrac-
tions of the criminal law.267 In contrast, community policing places a
premium on the police force's direct contact with the community on a
daily basis.26a The police respond to the community as a whole, devel-
oping a close working relationship in order to identify "community
nominated problems. ' 269 If the police are going to return to the
neighborhoods, they will need some legal basis to perform their order
maintenance function.270 Justice Stevens reasoned that the Ordinance
did not provide a sufficient basis because it allowed the police an or-
der maintenance authority that could infringe upon activity that was
in fact treasured, but traded away by the City Council. 271 In contrast,
Justice Scalia reasoned that the Ordinance was a reasonable exercise
of the City Council's power, and provided the police with a sufficient
basis to maintain order in the neighborhoods. 272
If the police force is going to return to the community, the proper
basis of police authority should come from the community itself. A
trade off should be analyzed from the perspective of the community,
not from the perspective of the City Council. A neighborhood's will-
ingness to support stricter community policing, which carries with it
the greater risk of police harassment, reflects a community's judgment
that the continued victimization of residents at the hands of criminals
poses a much more significant threat to the well being of residents,
than does the risk of arbitrary mistreatment at the hands of the po-
lice.2 73 The individual community's willingness to be subject to the
267. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 255-258 and accompanying text.
272. See discussion supra notes 259-264 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 248, at 19-20.
The principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is
not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws. Whereas mistreatment of sus-
pects, defendants, and criminals has often been used as an instrument of racial opres-
sion, more burdensome now in the day-to-day lives of African-Americans are private.
violent criminals who attack those most vulnerable without regard to racial identity.
Id. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1992)
[L]ittle enough attention is being paid to law-abiding people who are the lawbreakers'
victims. Drive-by shootings and random street crime have replaced lynchings as a
source of intimidation, and the "culture of terror" practiced by armed crack dealers and
warring adolescents has turned them into the urban equivalents of the Ku Klux Klan.
Id. But see Stewart, supra note 52, at 2254 (noting that expansion of police officers' already
significant discretionary powers should only occur after it has been proven that their racial biases
do not affect their work).
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law should be the basis for the police officer's authority to spontane-
ously enforce the law in the community.
The drafting and passage of the Chicago Gang Loitering Ordinance
was the product of community efforts throughout Chicago. 274 Alder-
men from high-crime wards worked with civic groups from their
neighborhoods to draft a stricture that met the communities' con-
cerns. 275 Additionally, the Ordinance passed because the Aldermen
from the high-crime sections of the City enthusiastically supported the
Ordinance. 276
The Order tailored the community support for the Ordinance to the
particular communities that wanted the Ordinance.2 77 For instance,
the Order mandated that the Ordinance could only be enforced in
parts of the City where loitering by street gangs had posed a demon-
strable problem.278 Additionally, the Order required district com-
manders to consult with community groups in making the
determination of whether gang loitering posed a demonstrable prob-
lem in the community. 279 Consequently, the Order incorporated the
community's will into the Ordinance. If the community failed to nom-
inate loitering as a demonstrable problem, the district commander
would not subject that portion of the City to the Ordinance. 280
However, had Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia analyzed the Ordi-
nance from the community perspective, that is, with the Order, both
of their concerns would have been placated. The Order appeased Jus-
tice Stevens' concern that the community's freedoms were inadver-
tently traded away, as well as addressing Justice Scalia's concern that
the community was being prevented from exercising its free will.
274. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 11, at 248; see also Editorial, Anti-gang law isn't the
answer, CHi. TRIB., May 20, 1992, §1 at 16 (reporting that "[f]or the last year neighborhood
groups have worked with Chicago aldermen to draft a legal battle plan against the city's fear-
some, intimidating street gangs"); Fran Spielman, Daley endorses anti-gang law: Rodriguez wary,
CH. SUN-TIMES, May 20, 1992, at 14 ("It's basically a response from block organizations,
churches and community groups.") (quoting Mayor Daley); John Kass, Old tactic sought in crime
war, CHI. TRIB. May 15, 1992, §2 at 1 (reporting that the gang loitering bill "is welcomed by
many residents of crime-ravaged neighborhoods"). But see Alschuler and Schulhofer, supra
note 113, at 217 (stating that the ordinance derived from efforts of a community group based in a
predominately white section of Chicago that was concerned about the increasing presence of
gangs in its community).
275. Meares & Kahan, supra note 11l, at 248 ("[T~he sponsoring Alderman worked closely
with leaders of various civic organizations from minority neighborhoods.").
276. Meares & Kahan, supra note 111, at 250 (relating that six aldermen representing districts
within the top ten most violent precincts voted in favor of the Ordinance).
277. See Chicago Police Dep't. General Order 92-4 at 2-3.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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To strike a recurrent theme, the Court failed to address the issue.
However, the issue is not an abstraction. Communities in jurisdictions
all over the country are assuming a novel role in crime control. 281 As
more city councils respond to constituents' new relationship with the
police, jurists must respond by reinventing their perspectives on
review.
V. IMPACT
Immediately after news of the Morales decision, Chicago Mayor
Richard M. Daley vowed to rework the Ordinance so that it would
pass constitutional muster. 28 2 On January 11, 2000, Mayor Daley un-
veiled a new anti-gang loitering ordinance that he claimed would sat-
isfy every Supreme Court objection. 283 The talk of a new Ordinance
281. See supra note 28.
282. Adrienne Drell & Fran Spielman, Loitering law nixed by court; Daley pledges to redraft.
CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 10, 1999, at 1 ("Mayor Daley and supportive aldermen immediately
pledged to draft a constitutionally valid law .... ).
283. (in Lexis News-By Individual Publication-UPI) (visited June 29, 2000). General
News, New Chicago anti-gang law unveiled, UNITED PRESS INT'L Jan. 12, 2000, at 1. The new
Ordinance reads in pertinent part as follows:
8-4-015 Gang Loitering
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a member of a criminal street gang engaged in
gang loitering with one or more other persons in any public place designated for the
enforcement of this Section under subsection (b), the police officer shall, subject to all
applicable procedures promulgated by the Superintendent of Police: (i) inform all such
persons that they are engaged in gang loitering within an area in which loitering by
groups containing criminal street gang members is prohibited; (ii) order all such per-
sons to disperse and remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at
which the order was issued; and (iii) inform those persons that they will be subject to
arrest if they fail to obey the order promptly or engage in further gang loitering within
sight or hearing of the place at which the order was issued during the next three hours.
(b) The Superintendent of Police shall by written directive designate areas of the City
in which the Superintendent has determined that enforcement of this Section is neces-
sary because gang loitering has enabled criminal street gangs to establish control over
identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal
activities. Prior to making a determination under this subsection, the Superintendent
shall consult as he or she deems appropriate with persons who are knowledgeable
about the effects of gang activity in areas in which the ordinance may be enforced.
Such persons may include, but need not be limited to, members of the Department of
Police with special training or experience related to criminal street gangs; other person-
nel of that Department with particular knowledge of gang activities in the proposed
designated area; elected and appointed officials of the area; community-based organi-
zations; and participants in the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy who are familiar
with the area. The Superintendent shall develop and implement procedures for the
periodic review and update of designations made under this subsection.
(c) The Superintendent shall by written directive promulgate procedures to prevent
the enforcement of this Section against persons who are engaged in collective advocacy
activities that are protected by the Constitution of the United States or the State of
Illinois.
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was accompanied by talk of a new battle in the courts.2 84 If the Ordi-
(d) As used in this Section:
(1) "Gang loitering" means remaining in any one palce under circumstances that
would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behav-
ior is to enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to
intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.
(2) "Criminal street gang" [See supra note 113, the definition is identical to the old
Ordinance's definition.]
(3) "Criminal gang activity" [See supra note 113, the definition is identical to the old
Ordinance's definition.]
(4) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" [See supra note 113, the definition is identical to
the old Ordinance's definition.]
(5) "Public place" [See supra note 113, the definition is identical to the old Ordinance's
definition.]
(e) Any person who fails to obey promptly an order issued under subsection (a), or
who engages in further gang loitering within sight or hearing of the place at which such
an order was issued during the three hour period following the time the order was
issued, is subject to a fine not less than $100 and not more than $500 for each offense,
or imprisonment for not more than six months for each offense, or both. A second or
subsequent offense shall be punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of not less
than 5 days imprisonment.
In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person who violates this section
may be required to perform up to 120 hours of community service pursuant to Section
1-4-120 of this Code.
8-4-017 Narcotics-related loitering
(a) Whenever a police officer observes one or more persons engaged in narcotics-re-
lated loitering in any public place designated for the enforcement of this Section under
subsection (b), the police officer shall: (i) inform all such persons that they are engaged
in loitering within an area in which such loitering is prohibited; (ii) order all such per-
sons to disperse and remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at
which the order was issued; and (iii) inform those persons that they will be subject to
arrest if they fail to obey the order promptly or engage in further narcotics-related
loitering within sight or hearing of the place at which the order was issued during the
next three hours.
(b) The Superintendent of Police shall .... [See subsection (b) above, duties of the
Superintendent in that Section are identical to the duties in this Section.]
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) "Narcotics-related loitering" means remaining in any one place under circum-
stances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of
that behavior is to facilitate the distribution of substances in violation of the Cannabis
Control Act or the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.
(2) "Public place" [See supra note 113, the definition is identical to the old Ordinance's
definition.]
(d) Any person who fails to obey promptly an order .... [See subsection (e) above, the
penalties in that Section are identical to the penalties under this Section.]
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § § 8-4-015, -017 (2000) (effective March 8, 2000).
284. See Fran Spielman, Daley faces heat on gang proposal, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at
12 (reporting that the Ordinance's chance of success in the courts is debatable, and that Mayor
Daley is willing to rewrite the Ordinance again and again until it survives legal challenge); Gen-
eral News, New Chicago anti-gang law unveiled, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 11, 2000, at I (report-
ing that Mayor Daley expects the Ordinance to face a court challenge). Mayor Daley had the
following riposte to his would-be challengers: "The lawyers and civil libertarians who will chal-
lenge this ordinance do not live in neighborhoods where they have to thread their way through
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nance is attacked in the courts, the Morales opinion will undoubtedly
be the focal point of the litigation. Thus, it will be helpful to analyze
and predict whether the City's second effort will be enough to appease
the Justices' concerns about the old Ordinance.
A. Proscribed Activity Under the New Ordinance
Most importantly, the new Ordinance abandons the "no apparent
purpose" definition of loitering in favor of tighter language that spe-
cifically defines the criminal conduct proscribed.2 85 The new law de-
fines two types of prohibited loitering: gang286 and narcotics
loitering.287 Gang loitering is defined as "remaining in any one place
under circumstances that warrant a reasonable person to believe that
the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street
gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others
from entering those areas or to conceal illegal activities. '28 Narcotics
related loitering is defined as "remaining in one place under circum-
stances that warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose
or effect of that behavior is to facilitate the distribution of substances
in violation of Illinois drug laws. '289
Like the old Ordinance, the new Ordinance requires the police to
give the loiterers a dispersal order.290 However, unlike the old Ordi-
nance, the new Ordinance requires the police to tell the group that
they must remove themselves from within sight and hearing distance
of the location for at least three hours.29' Furthermore, the police
must notify the group that they are engaged in gang loitering in an
area where gang loitering is prohibited, and then must give them time
to disperse. 292
In addition, the new Ordinance creates specific duties for the Super-
intendent of Police,293 such as designating areas of the City that are in
groups of gang-bangers luring kids to buy drugs a few feet from the school playground .. "
General News, New Chicago anti-gang law unveiled, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 12, 2000. at 1.
285. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § § 8-4-015, -017 (2000). The Court made plain its disap-
proval of the "no apparent purpose" standard. Morales, 527 U.S. at 57 ("If [a citizen of Chicago]
were frequently checking her watch and looking expectantly down the street, would she have an
apparent purpose?").
286. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (2000).
287. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-0M7 (2000).
288. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (2000).
289. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-017 (2000).
290. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CoiDE § § 8-4-015, -017 (2000).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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need of the Ordinance's protection. 294 The new Ordinance requires
the Superintendent of Police to promulgate regulations that will en-
sure that the Ordinance is not applied in a way that would infringe
upon citizens' constitutional rights.2 95
B. The Direct Response of the New Ordinance
Undoubtedly, the Morales opinion will be the focal point of a court
battle over the new Ordinance. Consequently, it was in the City's
interest to respond to the concerns raised by the Justices because at-
tention to those concerns will cut off the challengers' potential lines of
attack. The City's new Ordinance clears up the problems that were
specifically identified in Morales. Thus, challengers of the new Ordi-
nance will not have the benefit of old arguments because the City's
conscientious effort has rendered them moot.
1. Controlling Police Discretion
The six Justice Morales majority held that the Ordinance was un-
constitutionally vague because it afforded too much discretion to the
police.296 The Court identified the "no apparent purpose" standard as
the principal source of the vast discretion conferred on police,297
agreeing with the lower court that the standard provided an officer
with absolute discretion to decide whose purpose was apparent. 298 In
the majority's view, the arresting officer had free reign to decide when
to enforce the Ordinance because it did not provide the officer with a
clear standard to guide his arrest.299
While the majority was critical of the amount of discretion afforded
police under the Ordinance, it advised the City of Chicago that the
Ordinance was not fatally flawed. 3°° For instance, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, recognized the Ordinance's requirement that
an officer reasonably believe a group contains a gang member placed
a limit on the officer's authority.30 1 Justice Stevens continued, "[t]hat
limitation would no doubt be sufficient if the ordinance only applied
to loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect .... -302
However, Justice O'Connor clarified the majority's advice when she
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 527 U.S. at 64.
297. ld. at 61-62.
298. Id. at 62.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 62-63.
301. Id. at 62.
302. 527 U.S. at 62.
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wrote, "the Court properly and expressly distinguishes the ordinance
from laws that require loiterers to have a 'harmful purpose' . . . .33
Justice O'Connor went further, defining a harmful purpose for the
City: "The term 'loiter' might possibly be construed in a more limited
fashion to mean 'to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose
other than to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate
others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities."' 30 4
In short, the Court made the remedies to its objections abundantly
clear.
With an eye towards a future court battle, the City responded di-
rectly to the advice given by the Morales majority. For example, the
City heeded the majority's objection to the "no apparent purpose"
standard by abandoning it for a more definite objective standard that
would give guidance to the police and limit their discretion. 30 5 How-
ever, the new standard was far from innovative because the City care-
fully followed the Court's direction. First, the City responded to the
Court's direction regarding the inclusion of a harmful purpose stan-
dard, defining gang loitering as "remaining in any one place under
circumstances that warrant a reasonable person to believe that the
purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street gang to
establish control over identifiable areas .... -306 Additionally, the
harmful purpose that the City incorporated into the new Ordinance
has a familiar ring since it was, quite literally, taken from Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. 30 7 Simply put, the City did not leave any-
thing to chance. The City responded directly to the majority's concern
that the old Ordinance lent the police too much discretion by incorpo-
rating the more objective standard that was outlined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion. Thus, if the new Ordinance is attacked as afford-
ing too much discretion to the police, the City's first line of defense
will be the Morales majority's advice that was dutifully heeded.
2. Providing Citizens With Greater Notice
A three Justice plurality held that the Ordinance was unconstitu-
tionally vague because it left the public uncertain as to what conduct
was prohibited. 308 Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens reasoned
303. Id. at 67.
304. Id. at 68.
305. See supra notes 289-290 and accompanying text.
306. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (2000).
307. Morales, 527 U.S. at 66-69; see also Gary Washburn, Daley Pursuing Anti-Gang Law,
Cm. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2000, at 1 (recognizing that the new Ordinance features language similar to
Justice O'Connor's concurrence).
308. 527 U.S. at 56.
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that the public could not possibly grasp what the Ordinance prohib-
ited because the proscribed activity, standing on the street corner
without an apparent purpose, was up to the judgment of the arresting
officer. 30 9 Further, he reasoned that the dispersal order was an insuf-,
ficient form of notice because if the loitering was in fact harmless, the
alleged loiterer would not know whether he was justifiably ordered to
disperse.3 10 Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the form of the disper-
sal order compounded the inadequacy of the Ordinance's notice. 311
He maintained that the dispersal order raised a host of questions.
How long must the loiterers remain apart? "[H]ow far must they
move? If each loiterer walks around the block and they meet again at
the same location, are they subject to arrest or merely being ordered
to disperse again?" 31 2
The City has responded to the plurality's concern that the Ordi-
nance did not provide notice by abandoning the "no apparent pur-
pose" standard. 313 In place of the old standard, the City has provided
an ascertainable standard to which the public will be able to conform
its conduct. The new Ordinance informs every Chicagoan that if he
intends to stand on the street corner, he should not do so in a manner
that would lead a reasonable person to believe he was either attempt-
ing to establish control over the corner, or facilitating a drug trade. 314
One may argue that these standards are vague because "establish-
ing control" or "facilitating a drug trade" are loose concepts that the
arresting officer will ultimately determine. However, this sort of argu-
ment is always available. The real issue is whether the trier of fact will
have a legal standard with which to work. Looking at a set of facts
from Morales, it is apparent that these standards would put an alleged
loiterer on notice.
For instance, Daniel Washington, an admitted member of the Vice
Lords gang, was observed standing in the street, "yelling at passing
vehicles, stopping traffic, and preventing pedestrians from using the
sidewalks. ' 31 5 With those facts, we can safely assume that Washington
would know that his conduct was proscribed by the Ordinance, and
that the rational trier of fact could determine that Washington was
"establishing control." However, the effectiveness of the standards
becomes more apparent with a set of facts that fails to put an alleged
309. Id. at 56-7.
310. Id. at 58.
311. Id. at 59.
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 290-292 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 290-292 and accompanying text.
315. 527 U.S. at 82-83.
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loiterer on notice. For example, Jose Renteria, an admitted member
of the Satan Disciples, was observed standing on the street corner
with other gang members. 316 Without more, the officer made an ar-
rest. 317 Obviously, the arrest may have represented gross negligence
on the officer's part because the trier of fact would not have had any-
thing to work with. Additionally, we could hypothesize that Renteria
was conforming his conduct to the Ordinance by limiting his conduct
to idle conversation with his friends. Thus, by plugging facts into the
standards of the new Ordinance, it is evident that Chicagoans will be
put on notice of what is proscribed.
The City has also been responsive to the plurality's concern over
the terms of the dispersal order. Justice Stevens maintained that the
dispersal order raised a host of questions, 318 and the City has an-
swered all of them directly in the new Ordinance. For instance, Jus-
tice Stevens asked, "how long must the loiterers remain apart?" 319
The City answered by requiring the loiterers to leave the area and stay
away for at least three hours. 320 Justice Stevens asked, "[h]ow far
must they move?" 321 The City answered by requiring the loiterers to
remove themselves from within sight and hearing distance of the
targeted location. 322 Finally, Justice Stevens asked, "[i]f each loiterer
walks around the block and they meet again at the same location, are
they subject to arrest or merely being ordered to disperse again?" 323
The City answered by requiring the arresting officer to tell the loiter-
ers the consequences of disobeying the dispersal order.324
The above demonstrates the City's conscientious effort to be re-
sponsive to the plurality's concerns over notice. The City abandoned
the plurality's chief aggravation, the "no apparent purpose" standard.
In doing so, the City was able to more clearly define the proscribed
activity, and in turn, put the citizenry on notice of what conduct the
Ordinance seeks to prohibit. The City also provided direct responses
to the questions posed by Justice Stevens, evidencing an effort to ad-
dress even the plurality's secondary concerns. In sum, the City's con-
spicuous effort to appease the plurality would have to be recognized
in the next round of litigation.
316. Id. at 82.
317. Id.
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3. The Plurality's Right to Loiter
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens reasoned that one's deci-
sion to remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his
liberty as "the freedom of movement inside frontiers. '325 He con-
cluded that the United States recognizes that the freedom to loiter for
innocent purposes is part of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 26
At first blush, this section of the plurality seems fatally juxtaposed
to any City effort to ban gang loitering because it holds loitering as an
American ideal that deserves constitutional protection. However, the
plurality limited the substantive right to loiter "for innocent pur-
poses. ' 32 7 As argued above, the plurality introduced a constitutional
right to loiter in Morales because it feared the "no apparent purpose"
standard was vague enough to include a good deal of innocent con-
duct. 328 In abandoning the loose "no apparent purpose" standard for
a more objective "harmful purpose" standard, the City limited the
scope of the new Ordinance to loiterers with a harmful purpose.
Therefore, the City's attention to the plurality will work to cut off
challenges that the new Ordinance implicates an individual's constitu-
tional right to loiter because the new law does not prohibit loitering
for an innocent purpose.
Mayor Daley and the City of Chicago expect that the new Ordi-
nance will come under attack.3 29 However, if a new round of litigation
begins, it will be short-lived because the Morales Court took pains to
outline remedies for the vague Ordinance. In turn, the City has con-
scientiously heeded the Court's advice. Thus, would-be challengers of
the new Ordinance will enter the court battle with a distinct disadvan-
tage because their court of last resort played a pivotal role in legislat-
ing the new Ordinance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The year 2000 was ominous for Chicago.330 Unfortunately, every
year is ominous for some communities in Chicago. Bad years do not
give way to good years because there exists a perennial blight on the
structure of the community. Without a structure, residents and non-
325. Morales, 527 U.S. at 54.
326. Id. at 52-53.
327. Id. at 53.
328. See supra notes 259-263 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
330. Margaret O'Brien, Weekend Gunfire Claims 3 Lives; 6 People Injured in Weekend Shoot-
ings, Stabbings on South Side, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2000, at 3.
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residents treat the community and its environment with callous disre-
gard; problems perpetuate further problems because no one cares.
Perennial problems call for novel solutions, and many communities
around Chicago have become advocates of community policing. 331
Communities have taken a new look at their relationship to the police,
and have decided that cooperation may be the key to turning back the
tide.332
Yet, old ways die hard, and Morales serves as a bold reminder that
any new relationship between the community and police will be ques-
tionably adopted. The Court made it clear that police officer's discre-
tion was to be checked, and the return to the neighborhood must be
pursuant to some definite legal basis.333 While plain in its uneasiness,
the Court was unfortunately reticent regarding the constitutionality of
a new community/police dynamic. 334
Continued regret over Morales' insufficiencies is uncalled for be-
cause the Chicago City Council heeded the Court's advice, and re-
worked the Ordinance. Now the City of Chicago can only wait to see
if this community-policing legislation is novel enough to turn the tide.
Matt Wawrzyn
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